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Resolving the Hate Crimes/Hate Speech
Paradox: Punishing Bias Crimes and
Protecting Racist Speech
Frederick M. Lawrence*
Despise evil and ungodliness, but not men of ungodliness
or evil. These, understand.'
Not since the Nazis threatened to march in Skokie, 2 have we
focused so much on the hate crimes/hate speech paradox.- How

* Associate Professor of Law, Boston University. BA, Williams College; J.D., Yale
Law School. My thanks to Jack Beermann, Ron Cass, Alan Feld, and Pnina Lahav for
their help on this projeqct. I am also grateful to the participants of the Boston University
School of Law Faculty Workshop to whom an earlier version of this Article was presented. The comments received during and subsequent to that workshop presentation
were extremely helpful. I am particularly grateful to Joe Brodley, Avi Soifer, and Ken
Simons for their careful reading of this Article and their insightful comments. I would
also like to acknowledge the contributions of the members of my Civil Rights Crimes
seminar in the fall of 1992. My appreciation as well to Kelly McEnaney for her diligent
research and fine editorial assistance. Finally, I wish to acknowledge the support for this
project provided by a Boston University School of Law Summer Research grant.
1 WnflAM SAROYAN, THE TIME OF YOUR LIFE xxvii (1941).
2 The "Skokie cases" consisted of two cases arising out of the attempt by the Nazi
National Socialist Party of America to hold a march in the predominantly Jewish Chicago
suburb of Skokie, Illinois in 1977 and 1978. The first case involved a state court injunction prohibiting the Nazi party from holding the march or exhibiting Nazi symbols or
other materials that would promote hatred of Jews. An Illinois appellate court refused to
stay the injunction and the United States Supreme Court, per curiam, by a 5-4 vote,
reversed the denial of the stay and remanded the case to the Illinois state courts for
further proceedings. National Socialist Party of America v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43
(1977). On remand, the injunction was modified by an appellate court, 366 N.E.2d 347
(Ill. App. Ct. 1977), and ultimately fully vacated by the Illinois Supreme Court. 373
N.E.2d 21 (Ill.
1978).
The second Skokie case involved three ordinances enacted by. the village of Skokie
in May, 1977. The ordinances, which established a permit system for assemblies of more
than fifty persons, required applicants to obtain insurance in the amount of $350,000
and barred permits for assemblies that would, inter alla, incite hatred of an ethnic, religious, or racial group. Each ordinance, was struck down as unconstitutional. Collin v.
Smith, 447 F. Supp. 676 (N.D. Ill.), aftd, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cer. denied, 439 U.S.
916 (1978). See generally DONALD A. DowNs, NAZIS IN SKOICIE: FREEDOM, COMMuNrY, AND
THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1985); JAMES L GIBSON & RiCHARD D. BINGHAM, CIVIL LIBERTIES
AND NAZIS: THE SKOKIE FREE SPEECH CONTROVERSY (1985); DAvID HAMLIN, THE NAZI
SKOKIE CONF CT: A CIVIL LIBRTIES BATLE (1981).

3 In this Article, I refer to "hate crimes" as "bias crimes" and to "hate speech" as
"racist speech." I prefer these terms because "hate" says too much and too little about
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is it possible to protect victims of bias-motivated violence while
also protecting the right of the racist to express his beliefs?
The paradox has deep roots. Racially motivated violence excites an extraordinary level of public condemnation, arousing
passions that exceed the reaction to other forms of large-scale
violence or human tragedy.4 Yet the right to free expression of

the relevant criminal conduct or speech. What makes racially motivated violence is distinct, for example, is that the perpetrator is drawn to commit the offense by the victim's
race, ethnicity, religion, or national origin. Whether this qualifies as "hate" is quite beside
the point. Similarly, while many instances of personal, violent crimes involve hate as a
motive, unless a bias motive exists as well, they would not be considered civil rights
crimes. See Frederick M. Lawrence, Civil Rights and Criminal Wrongs: The Mens Rea of
Federal Civil Rights Crimes, 67 TJL. L. REv. at n.5 (forthcoming June 1993).
I use the term "race" in "racially" motivated violence or "racist speech" inclusively,
not exclusively. It thus encompasses motivation based not only on race, but also on the
color, ethnicity, religion, or national origin of the victim. As suggested by the title of this
Article, however, I will describe the conflict between the goals of punishing bias crimes
without punishing the holding of racist opinions as the "hate crimes/hate speech paradox."
4 Compare the attention given to the murder of Carol Stuart, initially thought to
have been committed by a black man in Boston, or the killing of Michael Griffith when
chased onto a highway by a group of taunting, bat-swinging white men in Howard -Beach,
New York to that given the myriad violent crimes that occur in those cities on a regular
basis. See, e.g., Donald Baer, The Day of "Man as Man," U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan.
22, 1990, at 10 (story on the Stuart murder after Charles Stuart committed suicide);
Montgomery Brower et al., A Dark Night of the Soul in Boston, TIME, Nov. 13, 1989, at 52
(story on the Stuart murder); Peter S. Canellos & Irene Sege, Couple Shot After Leaving
Hospita4"Baby Delivered, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 24, 1989, at 1 (story reporting the murder of
Carol Stuart); Peter J. Howe & Jerry Thomas, Reading Woman Dies After Shooting in Car,
BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 25, 1989, at 1 (same); Killing of Pregnant Woman Stirs Outrage, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 26, 1989, at A20 (same); Woman Shot in a Robbery Gives Birth and Then Dies,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1989, at Al (same); see also Dan Collins, A Bitter Bite of the Big Apple;
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 12, 1987, at 24 (story on the death of Michael Griffith);
4 Youths Charged in Attack on Blacks, CHI. TRiB., Dec. 23, 1986, at 4 (same); John
Goldman, Trial & Error, LIFE, Jan. 1988, at 90 (same); Howard Beach: Pointing the Finger,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 23, 1987, at 9 (same); Terry E. Johnson & Peter
McKillop, Howard Beach. An Angry Tide, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 12, 1987, at 25 (same); Robert D.
McFadden, Black Man Dies After Beating by Whites in Queens, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1986, at
Al (same); New Details Given in Queens Attack, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1986, at Al (same);
Ronald Smothers, New Coalition Condemns Howard Beach Assaults, N.Y. TIMES, .Dec. 24,
1986, at B4 (same).
Additional proof for the assertion in the text is found in the Rodney King beating,
although this requires additional explanation. The officers charged with the beating of
Rodney King were not accused of doing so with racial motivation under either California
or federal law. Moreover, it is at least an open question as to whether the California
state court jury that acquitted the officers might have done so regardless of King's race
and that of the defendants. Nonetheless, the aftermath of the acquittal in the state trial
was so dominated by the racial overtones of the case as to make clear that it was
seen-rightly or wrongly-as a case involving racial motivation. Perhaps the scale of the
rioting in Los Angeles would have drawn the public attention that it did, regardless of
the surrounding racial issues. I believe, however, that in large measure it was precisely
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ideas, no matter how distasteful or hateful, is a fundamental con-

stitutional principle.' The question of how much intolerance a
liberal democracy should tolerate has fueled debate for years.6
Consideration of bias crimes and racist speech focuses this ques-

tion in a compelling form.
Bias crimes and racist speech have spawned a great deal of
scholarly attention.7 Although initial judicial consideration of this
debate has centered around state university speech codes,8 the

scope of the debate has now broadened.
Last year, in RA.V. v. City of St. Pau, 9 the United States Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a modem bias

crime law'" for the first time. In the following months, the highest courts of Wisconsin and Ohio decided similar cases."

In

the racial issues so thoroughly interwoven throughout the Rodney King incident that
caused the nation to hold its collective breath during the Los Angeles riots of late April
and early May 1992.
5 See e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) ("If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the
expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable."); United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 654-55 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
("If there is any principle of the Constitution that more imperatively calls for attachment
than any other it is the principle of free thought-not free thought for those who agree
with us but freedom for the thought that we hate."), overruled by Girouard v. United
States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946).
6 See, eg., LEE C. BOLLIGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIEm. FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND ExTREMIST SPEECH IN SOCIETY (1986); ROBERT P. WOLFF Sl" AL, A CRrIQUE OF PURE TOLERANCE (1969).
7 See generally Symposium, Campus Hate Speech and the Constitution in the AJtermath of
Doe v. University of Michigan, 38 WAYE L. REv. 1309 (1991); Symposium, Free Speech &
Religios, Racial & Sexual Harassmen 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 207 (1991); Symposium,
Frontiers of Legal Thought. The New First Amendment, 1990 DUKE LJ. 375; Symposium, The
State of Civil Liberties: Where Do We Go From Here?, 27 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 309 (1992);
Symposium, Hate Speech After R.A.V.: Mo-e ConJfict Between Free Speech and Equality, 18 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 889 (1992); Richard Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules: Constitutional
Narratives in Collision, 85 NW. U. I REV. 343 (1991); Kent Greenawalt, Insults and Epithets:
Are They Protected Speech?, 42 RuTGERs L. REV. 287 (1990); David Kretzmer, Freedom of
Speech and Racism, 8 CA.DOZO L. REV. 445 (1987); Mar J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Stoq, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989); Ronald J. Rychlak,
Civil Rights, Confederate Flags, and Political Correctness: Free Speech and Race Relations on Campus, 66 TU. L. REV. 1411 (1992); Rodney A. Smolla, Rethinking First Amendment Assumptions About Racist and Sexist Speech, 47 WAsH. & LEE L. REV. 171 (1990); R. George
Wright, Racist Speech and the First Amendment, 9 MISS. C. I- REV. 1 (1988).
8 See infra text accompanying notes 39-43.
9 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
10 See infra note 44 and accompanying text; if. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250,
266 (1952).
11 Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807 (Wis.) (striking down the penalty enhancement provision of Wisconsin law for bias crimes), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 810 (1992);
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R.A.V., 12 the Supreme Court struck down a municipal ordinance
prohibiting cross burning and other actions "which one knows or
has reasonable grounds to know" will cause "anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or
gender.""3 In Wisconsin v. Mitchel,14 the Wisconsin Supreme
Court struck down a "penalty enhancement""5 law that increased
the level of punishment for certain crimes if committed with bias
motivation, while in Ohio v. Wyant,' 8 the Ohio Supreme Court
struck down that state's ethnic intimidation statute. 17 In each
case, the majority held that the bias crime law under review, while
understandable and even noble in purpose, were impermissible
interferences with First Amendment freedoms. 8 The Supreme
Court has now re-entered the fray as it has decided to review the
decision in Mitchell 9
This Article argues that the apparent paradox of seeking to
punish the perpetrators of racially motivated violence while being
committed to protecting the bigot's rights to express racism is a
false paradox. Put simply, we are making this problem harder than
it needs to be. We must focus on the basic distinction between
bias crimes-such as racially motivated assaults or vandalism-and
racist speech. Not only is it possible to maintain this distinction, it
is imperative that we do so. I will demonstrate that the problems
left unresolved by R.A.V. and within the bias crime debate are best
addressed by establishing this distinction. Focusing on the criminal
law aspects of RA.V. does not ignore the serious constitutional

Ohio v. Wyant, 597 N.E.2d 450 (Ohio), petition for cert. filed, 61 U.S.LW. 3303 (U.S. Sept.
29, 1992) (No 92-568) (striking down Ohio's ethnic intimidation statute).
12 The defendant-petitioner Robert Viktora was a minor at the time that the case

was first litigated, hence the use of his initials in the case name. Since that time,
Viktora's name has been widely reported because he has attainted the age of majority.

See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Roundup, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 1991, at A20;
Tony Mauro, Cross-Burning Law Collides With Freedom of Speech, USA TODAY, Dec. 4, 1991,
at AS; Derrik Z. Jackson, A Palace of Hate, BOSTON GLOBE, June 24, 1992, at 17; Don
Terry, The Supreme Court, N.Y.. TIMES, June 23, 1992, at A16. For consistency, the case
itself will nonetheless be referred to as "R.A.V."
13 ST. PAUL, MINN. LEGIS. CODE § 292.02 (1990); see infra note 49 for the full text

of the St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance.
14 485 N.W.2d 807 (Wis.), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct 810 (1992).
15 See infra notes 65-67, 70-73 and accompanying text.
16 597 N.E.2d 450, 458 (Ohio), petition for cert. filed, 61 U.S.L.W. 3303 (U.S. Sept. 29,
1992) (No. 92-568).
17 See infra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
18 See R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2550, 2558; Wjant, 597 N.E.2d at 459; Mitchell, 485
N.W.2d at 815, 817.
19 Mitchell 485 N.W.2d at 807.
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dimensions of the case. Bias crimes do raise complex questions of
free expression that I will address. I mean to emphasize, however,
that there has been a persistent tendency among courts and scholars to characterize incorrectly the issue raised by the St. Paul ordinance. As a result, the distinction between bias. crimes and racist
speech is blurred, or even denied.
This tendency transcends the ordinary divisions within legal
thought. Justice Scalia treated RA.V. as a pure case of racist
speech. Ronald Dworkin similarly defined the question in R.A.V. as
"whether a state may constitutionally make an assault a special
crime, carrying a larger sentence, because it is intended to express
a conviction the community disapproves of."' Both Justice Scalia
and Professor Dworkin incorrectly viewed RA.V. as posing solely
speech issues. Once RA.V. is framed in this manner, the outcome
is largely determined and the fate of bias crime laws sealed. We
naturally invoke content neutrality and the doctrine that all views
much be protected, particularly those that society detests." This
is the approach followed in R.A.V., Mitchell and Wyant.
The scholarly debate over racist speech and bias crimes also
has failed to explore the distinction. Foreshadowing the holdings
in R.A.V., Mitchell and Wyant, Susan Gellman argued that racist
speech restrictions and bias crimes are both unconstitutional interferences with free expression 2 At the other end of the spectrum, Mari Matsuda, among others, has argued that racist speech
is unprotected by the First -Amendment." Ironically, these opposing positions share a common premise: that proscription of bias
crimes involves regulation of expression and is either (1) impermissible; or (2) requires a justification for suppressing expression.
Even those who have sought a middle ground, such as Toni

20 Ronald Dworkin, The Coming Battles over Free Speech, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, June 11,
1992, at 55, 58.
21 See supra note 5.
22 Susan Gellman, Sticks and Stones Can Put You in Jai4 but Can Words Increase Your
Sentence? Constitutional and Poliy Dilemmas of Ethnic Intimidation Laws, 89 UCLA L REV.
33 (1991).
23 Matsuda, supra note 7; see also Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action
for Racial Insuts, Epithets, and Nanw-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L L REV. 133 (1982);
Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Holles Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990
DuKEIJ.
431.
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Massaro,24 wind up searching for a permissible
suppression of
5
speech-albeit a narrowly defined one.2
I wish to probe for a different middle ground, one that provides a framework for upholding and enforcing bias crimes while
at the same time protecting racist speech as a form of free expression. Part I of this Article explores the false paradox of hate crime
and hate speech, and proceeds to discuss briefly the context of
bias crime laws and the explosion of legislation and enforcement
in this area. Using RA.V., Mitchel, and Wyant as points of departure, it then turns to the standard First Amendment challenge to
these laws.
Part II begins the search for a resolution of the paradox, that
is, a theory by which bias crimes may be prosecuted while racist
speech is not. I first consider two promising, yet flawed, bases for
distinguishing bias crimes and racist speech. The first rests upon
the proposed distinction between "expression" and "conduct."
Although it is tempting to assert that racist speech is "expression"
and is thereby protected, whereas bias crimes are "conduct" that
may be criminalized, this is a distinction that will not hold. The
second flawed approach rests upon the distinction between pure
bias crime statutes and penalty enhancement statutes.2 This Article demonstrates that, although there is a descriptive difference
between these categories of bias crimes,2 7 it is not one that will
bear any normative weight. This proves to be a distinction without
a difference. A firmer basis for the distinction between bias crimes
and racist speech must be found elsewhere.

24

Toni M. Massaro, Equality and Freedom of Expression: The Hate Speech Dilemma, 32

WM. & MARY L. REV. 221 (1991).

In

his recent article on R.A.V., Akhil Amar also as-

sumes that bias crimes and racist speech inseparably raise the same First Amendment
issues. He goes on to argue that racist speech should be seen as implicating not only
First Amendment values but also the values embodied in the Reconstruction Amendments. See Akhil R. Amar, The Case of the Missing Amendments: RA.V. v. City of St. Paul,
106 HARV. L. REV. 124, 151-60 (1992).
25 In the text, I have chosen several representative examples of the trend toward an
analysis of bias crimes that ends with a discussion of racist speech. I should add, however, that there are several recent articles that, far from conflating bias crimes and racist
speech, choose to focus on racist speech alone and have done so thoughtfully and with
great insight. See, eg., Alon Hard, Bigotry, Pornography, and the First Amendment: A Theoy of
Unprotected Speech, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1887 (1992); Kretzmer, supra note 7, at 445; Robert
C. Post, Racist Speeth, Democracy and the First Amendment 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 267
(1991); see also Avi Soifer, The Substance of Pluralism: Keeping Company in American
Law and Letters 374-82 (1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). These are
not part of the trend that I criticize.
26 See infra notes 35-36, 90-98 and accompanying text.
27 See infra text accompanying notes 96-97.
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In Part 111-A, the search continues with an exploration of the
differences between the non-bias element of bias crimes and racist
28
speech: the "parallel crime" that is included in the bias crime,
and the parallel behavior that is part of racist speech. The parallel
behavior of racist speech is expression, a form of behavior that,
however offensive, is not made criminal in our legal system. Bias
crimes, however, have parallel crimes that are punishable. This is
true even When the parallel crime consists solely of speech. Speech
that is intended to frighten another into a state of serious fear is
a verbal assault that is criminally proscribable.
Part Ill-B further develops the concept of verbal assault and
offers a re-working of the "fighting words" doctrine established in
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire Chaplinsky is best understood today
as placing outside the reach of the First Amendment words that
are intended to and have the effect of creating fear of injury in
the addressee. Words that have the effect and even the intent to
hurt the target's feelings, however unfortunate, do not come under this understanding of "fighting words."
I then return to the context of bias motivation. The proposed
understanding of "fighting words" is consistent with a distinction
between prosecutable bias crimes and protected racial speech that
does not rely on a simplistic understanding of the speech-conduct
dichotomy. Racially targeted behavior that is intended to create
fear in its victim, and does so in fact, is a bias crime whether the
behavior is primarily verbal or physical. Racially targeted behavior
that vents the actor's racism and. perhaps disturbs the addressee
greatly is racial speech that is protected by the First Amendment.
Part IV addresses the two prime arguments that have been
advanced against the punishment of bias crimes. The first argument is based on the doctrine of content neutrality. Part V-A
demonstrates that the proposed distinction between bias crimes
and racist speech does not run afoul of the requirements of the
doctrine. The second argument, discussed in Part IV-B, is based
on the purported distinction between "intent" and- "motivation"
that asserts that an actor may be punished criminally on the basis
of his intent, but not his motivation. There are two flaws with this

28

I have developed elsewhere at length the distinction between parallel crimes and

civil rights crimes, of which bias crimes are one category. See Lawrence, supra note 3.
The distinction is discussed in sufficient detail for present purposes infra notes 91-97 and
accompanying text.
29 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
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argument. First, motivation is frequently a basis for criminal punishment. Second, the distinction between motivation and intent is
not clear, and these concepts are more properly seen as descriptive points on a continuum whose normative weight must be
found elsewhere.
RA.V. threatens to halt the past "decade's efforts to identify,
investigate, and prosecute bias crimes.' Understood in light of
the framework developed in this Article, this result is not constitutionally mandated.
I.

THE HATE GRIMES/HATE SPEECH PARADOX

During the 1980s, public concern over the level of racially
31
motivated violence in the United States rose dramatically.
Whether such concern was spawned by an actual increase in the
level of violence, by an increased level of public awareness, or by
both is difficult to know. Whatever the genesis, this past decade
saw the most significant legislative response to the problem of bias
crime since Reconstruction. Prior to 1980, only five states had any
type of bias crimes statutes.3 2 At the present time, thirty-one

30 In response to anticipated questions, for example, the FBI sent a letter to over
16,000 local law enforcement agencies to inform them that the decision in R.A.V. did
not affect their obligations to collect data under the Federal Hate Crimes Statistics Act of
1990. See Katia Hetter, Enforcers of Hate-Crime Laws Waty After High Court Ruling, WALL ST.
J., Aug. 13, 1992, at BI.
31 See ANTi-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, 1992 AUDrr OF ANTi-SFEmIc INcIDENTs (1993)
(discussing increases in bias crimes); Deadly Hate Violence at Record Levels Across the Nation
in 1992, KLANWATCH INTELUGENCE REP. (Southern Poverty Law Project, Montgomery,
Ala.), Feb. 1993, at 1 (discussing increases in bias crimes); see aso S. REP. No. 21, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1989), rep nted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 158 (legislative history of the Federal Hate Crimes Statistics Act); 131 CONG. REc. E512-02 (1985) (remarks of Rep. Kennelly
introducing the hate crime statistics legislation).
32 Most of the pre-1980 bias crime statutes were enacted to combat the activities of
the Ku Klux Klan. As a result, most of the laws addressed cross-burning and the wearing
of hoods or masks in public. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-58 (West 1991) (criminalizing
"[d]eprivation of rights" through the use of a burning cross, enacted 1949); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 876.20 (West 1991) (criminalizing wearing a mask or placing an exhibit for the
purpose of intimidation, enacted 1951); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-37(b)(1) (Michie 1990)
(criminalizing the burning of a cross with the intent to terrorize, enacted 1968); GA.
CODE ANN. § 16-11-38 (Michie 1990) (criminalizing the wearing of a hood or mask which
conceals one's identity, enacted 1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-12.7 to 14-12.10 (1991)
(criminalizing the wearing of hoods or masks, enacted 1953); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-12.12
(1991) (criminalizing cross-burning, enacted 1953); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-422 (Michie
1991) (prohibiting wearing masks or hoods in specific circumstances, enacted 1950); VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-423 (Michie 1991) (criminalizing cross-burning, enacted 1950).
The cross-burning statutes will be addressed with the "pure bias crime" statutes, infra
note 98. The majority of the "mask statutes" fall outside the scope of this Article since
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states have such laws"3 and federal bias crime legislation has been

they generally do not require that the prohibited action be coupled with violence or
threats of violence. See, eg., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-38 (Michie 1990) (criminalizing the
wearing of a hood or mask which conceals one's identity, enacted 1986). For a discussion
of these statutes, see Wayne R. Allen, Note, Klan, Cloth and Constitution.. Anti-Mask Laws
and the First Amendmen, 25 GA. L REV. 819 (1991).
The statutes which couple the mask prohibition with racial threats or violence will
be discussed with other bias crime statutes. FA. STAT. ANN. § 876.20 (West 1991); VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-423 (Michie 1991).
Only one state had a statute prior to 1980 that addressed the problem of assaults
perpetrated on individuals because of their race outside the traditional forum of Ku Klux
Klan assaults. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-57 (West 1991) (criminalizing ridicule of an
individual based on race, color or creed, enacted 1949).
33 CAL. PENAL CODE § 422.6 (West 1991) ("Interference with exercise of civil rights,"
enacted 1987); CAL. PENAL CODE § 422.7 (West 1991) ("Aggravating factors for punishment," any racially motivated crimes not covered, by § 422.6 have the penalty increased,
enacted 1987); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-9-121 (West 1990) .("Ethnic intimidation-injury, fear or property damage," enacted 1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-37 a
(West 1991) ("Deprivation of civil rights by person ,wearing mask or hood," enacted
1982); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3112.2 (1991) ("Defacing or burning cross or religious symbol; display of certain emblems," enacted 1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.085 (West 1990)
("Evidencing prejudice while committing offense," enacted 1991); IDAHO CODE § 18-7902
(1991) (harassment based on race, color, religion, etc., enacted 1983); IL. REV. STAT. ch.
38, para. 12-7.1 (1991) (commits assault, battery, etc., based on race, enacted 1983);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 708.2C (West 1992) ("Assault in violation of individual rights," lists
penalties, enacted 1992); IOWA CODE ANN. § 712.9 (West 1992) (penalty enhancement
statute, enacted 1992); IOWA CODE ANN. § 729A.2 (West 1992) (defines hate crimes for
use in this and other statutes, enacted 1992); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2931 (West
1989) ("Harassment based on characteristics," interference with free exercise of rights;
enacted 1987); MD. CRM. LAW CODE ANN. § 470A (1989) ("Crimes against religious
property, institutions, or persons," enacted 1988); MASS. GEN. L ch. 265, § .39 (1989)
("Assault or battery for purpose of intimidation," enacted 1983); MICH. COMP. LAWS §
750.147b (1991) ("Ethnic intimidation--causes or threatens harm to person or property
motivated by race, color, religion, gender, or national origin, enacted 1988); Mo. REV.
STAT. § 574.090 (1989) (-Ethnic intimidation in the first degree," enacted 1988); Mo.
REV. STAT. § 574.093 (1989) ("Ethnic intimidation in the second degree," enacted 1988);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-221 (1992) (malicious intimidation or harassment relating to
civil or human rights, 'enacted 1989); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-222 (1992) (sentence,
enhancement for offenses committed because of victim's race, enacted 1989); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 651:6(I)(g) (extended terms of imprisonment for crimes motivated by hos-

tility to race, religion, etc., enacted 1990); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2C:33-11 (1982) ("Defacement or damage of property by placement of symbol," enacted 1981); NJ. STAT. ANN. §
2C:44-3(e) (West 1992) (criteria for sentencing defendants acting with ill will, hatred, or
bias due to race, color, religion, sexual orientation, or ethnicity, enacted 1990); N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 240.31 (McKnney 1989) ("Aggravated harassment in the first degree," commits personal or property damage based on race, etc., enacted 1982); OHio REv. CODE
ANN. § 2927.12 (Anderson 1987) ("Ethnic intimidation," committing other crimes motivated by race, enacted 1987); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 850 (1990) ("Malicious intimidation or
harassment because of race," etc., enacted 1987); OR. REV. STAT. § 166.155 (1990) ("Intimidation in the second degree," tamper* with property or person due to race, etc.,.
enacted 1981); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2710 (1991) ("Ethnic intimidation," commits any
crime with malicious intent due to race, enacted 1982); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-42-3 (1991)
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proposed3 4
Bias crime laws may be divided into "pure bias crimes" and
"penalty enhancement" laws."5 Pure bias crimes are free-standing
criminal prohibitions of racially targeted violence. Penalty enhancement laws authorize an increased level of criminal punishment
when a crime is committed with racial motivation. The distinction
between these two categories is useful to understand what is at
stake in any particular bias crime statute. I will demonstrate below,
however, that the distinction between pure bias crimes and penalty
enhancement crimes is of no real relevance for purposes of the
present inquiry.'
Bias crime law has been the subject of great controversy precisely because it implicates two of our most cherished values: equal
treatment of citizens and free expression. The state may not punish a person for holding an opinion regardless of how obnoxious
that opinion may be to the general public or how good a predicI
("Ethnic or religious intimidation," enacted 1982); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-53-2 (1991)
('Threai by terror," burning crosses, displaying Nazi swastikas, etc., enacted 1981); R.I.
GEN. LAws § 11-53-3 (1991) ("Threats to immigrants," enacted 1983); TENN. CODE ANN., §
39-17-309 (1991) (intimidation due to race, religion, etc., enacted 1988); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-3-203.3 (1992) (committing a "primary offense" (assault, trespass, etc.) with the
intent to intimidate or terrorize, enacted 1992); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1455 (1991)
("Hate motivated crimes," increases penalties for violations of other crimes if committed
with a racist motivation, enacted 1989); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.080 (West 1991)
("Malicious harassment," intimidation because of race, includes cross-burning or defacing
with swastika etc., enacted 1981); W. VA. CODE § 61-&21 (1991) ("Prohibiting violations
of an individual's civil rights," injury or intimidation, based on race, religion, etc., enacted 1987); W. VA. CODE § 61-6-22 (1991) ("Wearing masks, hoods or face coverings,"
enacted 1988); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 939.645 (West 1991) ("crimes committed against certain
people or property," enacted 1988).
34 As of the time of writing, H.R. 4797, a bill that would enact federal bias crime
legislation, has been proposed by Congressman Charles E. Schumer, the Chairman of the
House of Representatives Subcommittee on Crime and Criminal Justice. Hearings have
been held on this bill and no further legislative action has been taken. Although there is
no pure federal bias crime statute, there are federal proscriptions against racially motivated interference with certain legal rights and a narrow category of crimes committed under color of law that are racially motivated. See 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2) (1988) (proscribing
force or intimidation against a victim because of the victim's race and because the victim
is engaged in one of certain enumerated activities); id. § 242 (proscribing disparate punishment of persons based on race or national origin).
35 "Pure bias crimes" proscribe specified racially motivated behavior directed at a
person or property. An example of a pure bias crime is to be found in the St. Paul,
Minnesota ordinance that was struck down by the Supreme Court in KA.V. See infra note
49, for the full text of the ordinance. "Penalty enhancement laws" increase the criminal
sanction (fine and/or term of incarceration) for certain crimes when those crimes are
committed with racial motivation. Penalty enhancement laws were at issue in both Mitchell
and WyanL See infra text accompanying notes 102-07.
36 See infra Part II-B.
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tor holding this belief might be for future anti-social conduct. It is
striking that Chief Justice Vinson, not renowned as a strong advocate of a robust view of the First Amendment,"' saw no need to
provide any support for his assertion that "[o]f course we agree
that one may not be imprisoned or executed because he holds
particular beliefs."' It is clear that a racist may not be punished
merely for believing in racism.
"Belief... is the first stage in the process of expression. "39
No law has sought to punish mere belief in racism. Regulation of
the succeeding stages of expression have, however, occurred. The
contemporary debate over the hate crimes/hate speech paradox
began in the context of university speech codes. Concerned over
the increase in racial tensions on campuses, many schools adopted
policies proscribing the expression of racial or religious bigotry.'
These codes received a mixed scholarly reception.4 None, however, has survived a First Amendment challenge in court. Thus far
they have been viewed as prohibitions of speech based solely on
the content of that speech.4 Although sympathetic with the goals

37 See, eg., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (Vinson, C.J., plurality opinion). In Dennis, the plurality of the Court applied the "clear and present danger" standard to permit the prosecution of leaders of the Communist Party. According to Chief
Justice Vimson, the teaching of Marxist-Leninist doctrine by the Communist Party from
1948 to 1951 posed a sufficiently clear and present danger of an overthrow of the American government to warrant prosecution of the party's leaders. Id at 517. Vinson's use of
the "clear and present danger" test has been justly criticized as an interpretation that
,virtually abandoned the element of 'clear,' greatly subordinated the element of 'present,'
and overemphasized the element of the seriousness of the 'evil.'" THOMAS I. EMERSON,
THE STEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 114 (1970).

38 American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 408 (1950).
39 EMERSON, supra note 37, at 21.
40 Campus speech codes vary in terms of scope; some proscribe bias as to race, religion, gender, national origin, and sexual orientation. See REGULATING RACIAL HARASSMENT
ON CAMPuS: A LEGAL COMPENDIUM (Thomas P. Hustoles & Walter B. Connally, Jr. eds.,
1990); Ken Emerson, Only Co'red, NEw REPUBLIC, Feb. 18, 1991, at 18 (discussing the
University of Wisconsin speech policy); Jon Wiener, Free Speech for Campus Bigots, NATION,
Feb. 26, 1990, at 272 (discussing the University of Michigan speech policies).
41, Compare Delgado, supra note 7, Lawrence, supra note 23, and Matsuda, supra note
7 with Burt Neuborne, Ghosts in the Attic: Idealized Pluralisn, Community and Hate Speech, 27
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L REV. 371 (1992) and Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal?,1990 DUKE L.J. 484.
42 See UWM Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Wis., 774 F. Supp. 1163
(E.D. Wis. 1991) (striking down the speech code at University of Wisconsin as violation
of students' First Amendment right of free expression); Doe. v. University of Mich., 721
F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (striking down speech code at University of Michigan as
violation of students' First Amendment right of free expression); see also Robert A.
Sedler, The Unconstitutionality of Campus Bans on "Racist Speech." The VIrew From Without and
Within, 53 U. PrT. L. REv. 631 (1992) (arguing that public university speech codes nec-
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of the campus speech codes, the district court that struck down
the regulations adopted by the University of Michigan ruled that
the regulations impermissibly interfered with the First Amendment.4 3
University speech codes have no direct analog in general
society. There has been no contemporary attempt by any state to
apply a racist speech code to the general public." Beginning
with the R.A.V. case, courts moved beyond the setting of the university and confronted general bias crime laws for the first time
since the dramatic legislative activity in this arena. The Court's
decision in R.A.V. is certain to play a critical role in shaping the
current bias crime debate.4 Along with state cases such as Wyant

essarily violate the First Amendment).
Campus speech codes at private universities do not implicate the First Amendment
and are largely inapposite to the issue of bias crime laws at issue in this Article. See Ira C.
Lupu, Statutes Revolving in Constitutional Orbits, 79 VA. L REV. 1, 9-10 (1993) (discussing
impact of decision interpreting First Amendment on conduct of private universities).
43 See University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. at 861-67; see also Comment, First
Amendment-Racist and Sexist Expression on Campus-Court Strikes Down University Limits on
Hate Speech. Doe v. University of Michigan, 103 HARv. L REV. 1397 (1990).
44 Group libel laws, by punishing the dissemination of racially slanderous or inflammatory statements, have functioned as a type of public racist speech code. EMERSON,
supra note 37, at 393; see Soifer, supra note 25, at 374-82. The Supreme Court approved
the use of these statutes in Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952). The Court held
that, just as interpersonal libel fell outside the protection of the First Amendment, group
libel was similarly unprotected.
The ability to use group libel statutes to enforce a speech code has been severely
undercut by subsequent decisions. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964), for example, the Court held that libel was nt completely outside the scope of
First Amendment protections. The Court further applied the New York Times rule to the
context of criminal libel laws, stating that the First Amendment "also limits state power
to impose criminal sanctions for criticism of the official conduct of public officials." Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 67 (1964). Both decisions cast doubt on the premise in
Beauhanais that libel falls outside the domain of the First Amendment.
Moreover, in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), the Court restricted the
power of the state to regulate expression to words that incite or produce "imminent
lawless action." Id. at 447; see also infra note 109. This would appear to leave out the
power to punish words that cause harm because "a man's job and his educational opportunities and the dignity accorded him may depend as much on the reputation of the
racial and religious group on which he willy-nilly belongs, as to his own merits."
Beauharnais,343 U.S. at 263 (Frankfurter, J.).
The combined effect of these decisions appear to preclude a state from using
group libel statutes to create a de facto speech code. Nonetheless, these statutes still exist
in a number of states. See EMERSON, supra note 37, at 369; MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 272, §
98C (Law. Co-op 1992). Since Beauharnais, however, no conviction under a group libel
statute has been judicially upheld.
45 See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807, 814-15 (Wis.) (citing the R.A.V. decision), cert. granted 113 S. Ct. 810 (1992); Ohio v. Wyant, 597 N.E.2d 450, 458 (Ohio)
(citing the R.A.V. decision), petition for cert. filed, 61 U.S.LW. 3303 (U.S. Sept. 29, 1992)
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and Mitchell it provides the best point, of departure for an examination of the First Amendment issues that underpin the hate
crimes/hate speech paradox.
The Supreme Court was unanimous in striking down the St.
Paul ordinance at issue in RPA.V., but agreed about little else.
Four Justices concurred in the judgment of the Court, but did so
solely on the grounds of overbreadth. 6 It is safe to assume that
these Justices would have upheld a narrowly-drawn bias crime
statute. The other five members of the Court, in the majority
opinion of Justice Scalia, reached further and found that the St.
Paul ordinance-and presumably any bias crime law-was an unconstitutional content-based regulation of speech.47
The facts of the RA.V. case require only brief amplification.' Robert Viktora, then a minor, was accused of burning a
cross on the lawn of Russell and Laura Jones and their children,
an African-American family that had recently moved into the
neighborhood. Viktora was charged with violating St. Paul's BiasMotivated Crime Ordinance.4 9 In moving to dismiss the indictment, Viktora asserted both that the ordinance was overbroad and
that it was an unconstitutional, content-based restriction on
speech. The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected the overbreadth
challenge because it construed the language "arouses anger, alarm
or resentment in others" in the ordinance as applying only to

(No. 92-568); see also ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, supra note 31.
46 R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2558-60 (White, J., concurring in the judgment); iii at 2561
(Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment); id at 2571 (Stevens, J., concurring in the
judgment).
justices Blackmun and O'Connor joined Justice White's concurring opinion in full.
Justice Stevens joined Justice White's opinion only in part and filed a separate concurring
opinion in which Justices White and Blackmnun joined in part.
Justice Blackmun filed a separate 'brief concurring opinion in which he reiterated

some of Justice White's arguments and added a barbed observation as to the underlying
basis for the majority's opinion. "I fear," Justice Blackmun wrote, "that the Court has
been distracted from its proper mission by the temptation to decide the issue over 'politically correct speech' and 'cultural diversity,' neither of which is presented here." Id. at
2561.
47 Id. at 2538-50.
48 See suPra note 13 and accompanying text.
49 The St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance provides:
Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation, characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi
swastika, which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger,
alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or
gender commits disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
ST. PAUL, MINN. LEGIs. CODE § 292.02 (1990).
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"fighting words," and therefore not to any expression protected by
the First Amendment.' Although a minority of the Supreme
Court held that this limiting construction by the Minnesota court
did not save the ordinance from overbreadth, 1 Justice Scalia was
prepared to accept that all of the expression reached by the ordinance was proscribable. He thus had to reach the content-based
challenge, and it is to that challenge that I now turn.
Justice Scalia proposed a limited categorical approach to the
First Amendment."2 Accepting that "fighting words," along with
other categories of expression such as obscenity and defamation,
are not entitled to full First Amendment protection, Justice Scalia
went on to assert that these forms of expression nevertheless enjoy
some limited protection. These categories of speech, he wrote, are
not "entirely invisible to the Constitution. " 3 Expression within
one of these categories may be proscribed, but only on the basis
of its categorical nature and not on the basis of its content.
"Fighting words" are "analogous to a noisy sound truck:" the state
may regulate or even ban this form of expression altogether, but
not on the basis of the content of the message.' According to

50 See In 7e Welfare of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d, 507, 510 (Minn. 1991). The Minnesota
Supreme Court in R.A.V. relied upon the earlier construction of the St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance in In re Welfare of S.LJ., 263 N.W.2d 412 (Minn. 1978). In both
cases, the court invoked the fighting words doctrine created in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), and limited the St. Paul Ordinance to "conduct that itself inflicts injury or tends to incite immediate violence." See R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d at 510-11.
51 See RA.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2558-60 (White, J., concurring).
52 The categorical approach to First Amendment jurisprudence assigns certain forms
and types of expression to categories that receive less protection than does general expression. For a strong defense of the categorical approach, see Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Ad, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265, 307 (1981); Cass
R. Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment 1986 DUKE L.J. 589, 601-08.
Categorical First Amendment methodology has been criticized as well. See, &g., Kenneth L Karst, Equality as a Cenral Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CI. L. REV. 20
(1975) (categorical approach denies equal respect for all expression); Martin H. Redish,
The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 594-95 (1982) (general categorical methodology violates personal autonomy that is critical to First Amendment); Pierre J. Schlag,
An Attack On Categorical Approaches to Freedom of Speech, 30 UCLA L REV. 671 (1983) (categorical approach is inherently not viable as a First Amendment methodology); Geoffrey
R. Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of its Content. The Peculiar Case of Suject-Matter Restriction, 46 U. CHI. L REV. 81 (1978) (attacking categories as non-neutral and therefore
inappropriate as basis for determining First Amendment protection).
For a synthesis of the categorical approach and methodologies based on contextual
balancing of interests, set: John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1481 (1975).
,53 RA.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2540.
54 Id. at 2545 (citing Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 282 (1951) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring in the result)).
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Justice Scalia, expression operates either in the full light of the
First Amendment or in the shadow of that Amendment but never
wholly outside of its protection. 5 Regardless of the First Amendment status of a category of expression, according to Justice Scalia,
content-based regulations are the greatest evil and are "presumptively invalid. " -56
I suggest below that Justice Scalia's approach in RA.V. is thoroughly flawed as applied to bias crimes because, in this context, it
misconceives the requirements of the content-neutrality doctrine.5 7 It is important to recognize precisely what this approach
is or, more importantly, what it claims not to be. It does not purport to require the state to proscribe all forms of proscribable
speech or none at all. Rather, Justice Scalia identified several exceptions to the .general unacceptability of content-based restrictions on expression. Under the first set of exceptions, choices may
be made as to which forms of speech to proscribe so long as they
do not address the content of the expression. For example, the
regulations upheld in Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC,58 restricted obscene communications when the medium of communication
was the telephone.59 According to Justice Scalia, the provisions at
issue in Sable permissibly regulated the medium but not the message.

55 Justice Scalia takes as metaphor, not as literal statements of law or policy, such
pronouncements by the Court that some expression falls "not within the area of constitutionally protected speech" or outside the protection of the First Amendment. Id. at 2543
(citing Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc. 466 U.S. 485, 504 (1984)
(commercial speech); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957) (obscenity);
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952) (defamation); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (fighting words)).
56 Id. at 2542. The requirement of content-neutrality is one of the fixed points in
First Amendment analysis. Ordinarily, content-based regulations of expression are presumptively invalid. See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); RODNEY A.
SMOuA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SocIErY 46 (1992); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSmTrUTIONAL LAW 789-825 (2d ed. 1988); Henry P. Monaghan, Overteadih, 1981 SUP.
Cr. REV. 1, 14. Only a limited number of categorical exceptions to this general rejection
of content-based regulations have been recognized, and these exceptions have been narrowed over time. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1972) (obscenity); Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 3'23 (1974) (narrowing permissible scope of state libel law); New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (same). A third categorical exception,
that of "fighting words" under Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), will
receive detailed attention infra Part Ill-B. See also Ely, supra note 52, at 1497-98.
57 See infra text accompanying notes 145-62.
58 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
59 See id. at ,124-26 (cited in R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2545).
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Justice Scalia would also exempt from the content-neutrality
rule regulations that address content solely for the very reason the
entire "class of speech at issue is proscribable" in the first place.
Justice Scalia provided two examples of this type of exception.
First, a regulation prohibiting only obscenity "which is the most
patently offensive in its pruience" would be permissible. 60 The second, and somewhat more curious example is that of threats6 1of
physical violence directed at the President of the United States.
Justice Scalia found that the St. Paul ordinance did not fall
within either exception. Rather, when he applied his approach to
the St. Paul ordinance, he concluded that the city had established
a regulation aimed directly at racist speech and biased beliefs
rather than at "fighting words" generally or at a sub-group of
"fighting words" selected for reasons other than the content of
those words. He thus held that the ordinance impermissibly chose
sides in the debate over racial or religious prejudice. In what is
now perhaps the most famous sentence in his RA.V. opinion,
Justice Scalia wrote: "St. Paul has no such authority to license one
side of a debate to fight freestyle, while requiring the other to
follow Marquis of Queensbury Rules."6 2
Justice Scalia's majority opinion thus does not permit any
distinction between racist speech and bias crimes. The effort of
the state to punish bias crime, in his view, is unavoidably infected
with the impermissible attempt to suppress racist speech. This view
was adopted, with some modification, by the courts in Wisconsin v.
MitchelP and Ohio v. Wyant. 4
The facts of these two cases may be briefly summarized. In
the Wisconsin case, the defendant was Todd Mitchell, a nineteenyear-old black man, who was convicted of aggravated battery for
his role in the severe beating of Gregory Riddick, a fourteen-yearold white male. Under Wisconsin law, this crime carries a maximum sentence of two years.' Wisconsin's penalty enhancement

60 R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2545-46 (emphasis in original).
61 Id. at 2545-46. As will be discussed below, it is not at all self-evident why a special
crime prohibiting only threats against the President springs from the 'very reason" that
the entire class of threats of physical violence is proscribable. See infra text accompanying
notes 157-62.
62 R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2548.
63 485 N.W.2d 807 (Wis.), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 810 (1992).
64 597 N.E.2d 450 (Ohio), petition for cert. fied, 61 U.S.L.W. 3303 (U.S. Sept. 29,
1992) (No. 92-568).
65 Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 939.05, 939.50(3)(e), 940.19(lm) (West 1991) (sentence for
complicity in aggravated battery is two years).
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law, however, provides that the potential penalty for a racially
motivated aggravated battery is seven years. 66 In addition to his
conviction for battery, Mitchell was found to have acted out of
racial bias in the selection of the victim. Facing a possible67 seven
year sentence, he was sentenced to four years incarceration.
Wyant arose out of a series of cases commenced under Ohio's
ethnic intimidation law.' The charges brought against David
Wyant, a white male, were based upon his use of vulgar and

66

Wis. STAT. ANN. § 939.645 (West 1991) provides:

(1) If a person does all of the following, the penalties for the underlying
crimes are increased as provided in sub. (2):
(a) Commits a crime under chs. 939 to 948.
(b) Intentionally selects the person against whom the crime under par. (a)
is committed or selects the property which is damaged or otherwise affected by
the crime under par. (a) because of the race, religion, color, disability, sexual
orientation, national origin or ancestry of that person or the owner or occupant
of that property.
(2) (a) If the crime committed under sub. (1) is ordinarily a misdemeanor
other than a Class A misdemeanor, the revised maximum fine is $10,000 and
the revised maximum period of imprisonment is one year in the county jail.
(b) If the crime commented under sub. (1) is ordinarily a Class A misdemeanor, the penalty increase under this section changes the status of the crime
to a felony and the revised maximum fine is $10,000 and the revised maximum
period of imprisonment is 2 years.
(c) If the crime commented under sub. (1) is ordinarily a felony, the
maximum fine prescribed by law may be increased by not more than $5,000 and
the maximum period of imprisonment prescribed by law for the crime may be
increased by not more than 5 years.
(3) This section provides for the enhancement of the penalties applicable
for the underlying crime. The court shall direct that the trier of fact find a special verdict as to all of the issues specified in sub. (1).
(4) This section does not apply to any crime if proof of race, religion,
color, disability, sexual orientation, national origin or ancestry is required for a
conviction for that crime.
id. The statute was amended in 1991, effective May 14, 1992. The amended subsection
(1)(b) now provides:
(b) Intentionally selects the person against whom the crime under par. (a) is
committed or selects the property that is damaged or otherwise affected by the
crime under par. (a) in whole or in part because of the ador; beief or perception
regardingthe race, religion, color, disability, sexual orientation, national origin or
ancestry of that person or the owner or occupant of that property, whether or not
the acors belief or perception was corred.
Id. (West 1992) (emphasis added to new language).
67 Mitchell4 485 N.W.2d at 807.
68 Three other cases were consolidated in the Wyant appeal to the Ohio Supreme
Court. In each case, the indictment for ethnic intimidation was dismissed on the grounds
that the ethnic intimidation statute was unconstitutional. Accordingly, the facts of these
cases are not given in the opinion of the Supreme Court of Ohio. See Wyant 597 N.E.2d
at 451.
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threatening language directed at a black couple, Jerry White and
Patricia McGowan, at a campsite. The Ohio statute is a penalty
enhancement law applicable to a number of personal and property crimes which, if committed "by reason of the race, color, religion, or national origin of another person or group of persons,"
69
are elevated to the next grade of offense.
The decision in Mitchel4 announced the day after R.A.V.,
adopted much the same approach as did Justice Scalia. The Wisconsin court held that the penalty enhancement law "punishes the
defendant's biased thought.

. .

and thus encroaches upon first

amendment
rights." °
Because
Todd
Mitchell's
conduct-regardless of motivation-was punishable as an aggravated
battery, the court held that the only basis for the enhanced sentence was Mitchell's beliefs. "The hate crimes statute," the court
stated, "enhances the punishment of bigoted criminals because
they are bigoted." 71 Not only would this constitute an impermissible interference with Mitchell's own right to his ideas, the court
held, but it would chill the holding and expression of similar
ideas by others for fear of providing evidence for a future bias
crime charge.

72

In addition to tracking the holdings in PhA.V. and Mitchell the
Ohio Supreme Court bolstered its conclusion with an additional
argument rooted less in First Amendment jurisprudence than in
criminal law doctrine. The court argued that punishing motive was
the equivalent of thought control.7"
It is sufficient here to note the common thread that runs
through Justice Scalia's opinion in R.A.V. and those in Mitchell and

69

OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2927.12 (Baldwin 1992) provides:

(A) No person shall violate section 2903.21, 2903.22, 2909.06, or 2909.07,
or division (A)(3), (4), or (5) of section 2917.21 of the Revised Code by reason
of the race, color, religion, or national origin or another person or group of
persons.
(B) Whoever violates this section is guilty of ethnic intimidation. Ethnic
intimidation is an offense of the next higher degree than the offense the commission of which is a necessary element of ethnic intimidation.
Id.
70 Mitche, 485 N.W.2d at 812.
71 Id. at 814.
72 Id. at 815-16; see Gellman, supra note 22, at 360-61 (discussing potential chilling
effect of bias crime laws).
73 Ohio v. Wyant, 597 N.E.2d 450, 454 (Ohio) ("The same crime can be committed
for any of a number of different motives. Enhancing a penalty because of motive therefore punishes the person's thought, rather than the person's act or criminal intent."),

petition for ort. fied, 61 U.S.L.W. 3303 (U.S. Sept. 29, 1992) (No 92-568).
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Wyant.74' All conclude that bias crimes-pure bias crimes and penalty enhancement laws-inevitably represent an unconstitutional
regulation of racist speech and thought. It is therefore seen to be
impossible to separate racist speech from bias crimes. Because the
former must be protected under the First Amendment, the latter
may not be punished. I share the conclusion of those who assert
that racist speech may not be regulated .75' If there were no meaningful distinction between bias crimes and racist speech, I would
share the position of those who assert that bias crimes do not
survive First Amendment scrutiny. .Indeed, the search for this distinction is animated by the goal of determining if bias crime laws
are constitutional.
II.

RESOLVING THE HATE CRIMES/HATE SPEECH PARADOX:
A DETOUR DOWN Two DEAD ENDS

The search for a distinction between protected racist speech
and proscribable bias crimes begins with brief consideration of two
unsuccessful approaches: the purported distinctions between (1)
speech and conduct and (2) pure bias crimes and penalty enhancement laws.
A.

Speech vs. Conduct

It is tempting to distinguish bias crimes from racist speech by
describing bias crimes as conduct and racist speech as strictly expression. This approach was explored by Thomas Emerson, among
others. 76 Despite substantial scholarly criticism, 77 the purported

74 I discuss the strength and viability of the position adopted by the court in Wyan,
infra Part IV-B.
75 See, eg., SMOLLA, supra note 56, at 156-69; Massaro, supra note 24, at 218-19 ("[A]
conservative reading of contemporary constitutional law reveals that hate speech cannot
be suppressed" unless it falls within the narrow bounds of "fighting words."). But see Lawrence, sup-a note 23, at 449-57; Matsuda, supra note 7, at 2320-81.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to construct a full critique of those who have
argued that racist speech itself may be punished. I have argued elsewhere that any theory
that limits the protection of expression based upon the results of that expression will be
seriously flawed. See Frederick M. Lawrence, The Coastwise Voyager and the First Amendment,
69 B.U. L. REV. 897, 920-22 (1989). For purposes of the present project, I will assume
that First Amendment doctrine ought not to permit punishment of racist speech and
thought. Put somewhat differently, I intend to show that this assumption does not require the conclusion drawn by others that bias crime laws are thus similarly unconstitutional.
76 See EMERSON, supra note 37, at 80-90; see also Anthony S. Winer, The R.AN. Case
and the Distinction Between Hate Speech Laws and Hate Crime Laws, 18 WM. MITCHELL L
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dichotomy and its role as a tool in constitutional analysis has a remarkable sticking quality. In his RPA.V. opinion, for example, Justice Scalia distinguished impermissible content-based restrictions
from other restrictions, such as laws against treason, that are "directed not against speech but against conduct. " ' More recently,
the Supreme Court of Oregon upheld that state's bias crime law
because it was a law "directed against conduct not a law directed
against the substance of speech." 9
Professor Emerson did not suggest that a perfect distinction
could be drawn between speech and action. He conceded that
"[t]o some extent' expression and action are always mingled; most
conduct includes elements of both."" Nonetheless, Emerson proposed that a sufficiently workable dichotomy exists between speech
and action to permit judicial inquiry into which element was "predominant" in any particular behavior. Although the Supreme
Court never explicitly adopted Emerson's proposal, it did draw on
the distinction between speech and conduct in an effort to place
certain behavior beyond the protected bounds of "expression."81
In application, however, the speech-conduct dichotomy is far
too brittle. Emerson himself noted that efforts to apply the distinction will "be based on a common-sense reaction" to a great extent. 2 Therein lies the problem. It is not just that speech and

REv. 971, 972-76 (1992).
77 See, e.g., Ely, supra note 52, at 149496; Melville B. Nimmer, The Meaning of Symbolic Speech under the First Amendment, 21 UCLA L. REV. 29 (1973).
78 RA.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2546 ("[A] particular content-based subcategory of a
proscribable class of speech can be swept up incidentally within the reach of a statute
directed at conduct rather than speech.").
79 See Oregon v. Plowman, 838 P.2d 558 (Or. 1992). The court upheld the Oregon
racial intimidation law that makes it a crime for two or more persons to "intentionally,
knowingly, or recklessly cause physical injury to another because of their perception of
that person's race, color, religion, national origin or sexual orientation." OR. .REV. STAT. §
166.165(1) (a) (A) (1990). The court concluded that the Oregon statute could be distinguished from the St. Paul ordinance struck down in R.A.V. because the St. Paul ordinance was "directed at conduct" whereas the Oregon statute was "directed against the
substance of speech." Powman, 838 P.2d at 878.
80 EMERSON, supra note 37, at 80.
81 See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) ("We cannot accept the
view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled 'speech' whenever the
person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea."); Cox v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 536, 555 (1965) ("We emphatically reject the notion ...
that the [First
Amendment] afford[s] the same kind of freedom to those who would communicate ideas
by conduct . . . [as] to those who communicate by pure speech."); see also Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15, 27 (1971) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Cohen's absurd and immature antic, in my view, was mainly conduct and little speech.").
82 EMERSON, supra note 37, at 80.
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action are intermingled. There is a dialectic encompassing speech
and conduct that precludes not only a neat separation of the two
but also Emerson's efforts to determine whether act or expression
is the "predominant element" in certain behavior. Consider two
examples used by Emerson himself. the burning of a draft card
and the assassination of the President.as To Emerson, "it seems
quite clear that the predominant element [in the burning of a
draft card] is expression,"" but that assassination is proscribable
conduct.85
Even this obvious example requires further analysis, however.
It is not only obvious to Emerson that assassination must be conduct. It must be equally clear to him that what distinguishes an
assassination of the President from a case of ordinary murder is
also "conduct." Otherwise, it would be impermissible to punish the
assassination as anything beyond any other murder. The slipperiness of the speech-conduct distinction is apparent. One could
easily argue that the predominant way in which a presidential
assassination differs from any other murder, and the reason it is
punished more severely, is that it is the quintessential expression
of a deeply held (and dangerous) opinion about the President
and/or our system of government. Such may very well have been
the case with the assassinations of, at least, Presidents Lincoln and
McKinley.'
Although it is harder to contend that the major part of burning a draft card is the conduct of burning, 7 it is at least plausi-

83 Laws specifically related to draft card destruction and assassination of the President have been upheld by the Supreme Court. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367
(1968) (upholding conviction for burning of a draft card); Watts v. United States, 394
U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (upholding facial validity of 18 U.S.C. § 871 which criminalizes
threats of violence against the President of the United States; specific threat in Watts
held to be insufficient to satisfy requirements of § 871).
84 EMERSON, supra note 37, at 84.
85 Id. at 80 (assassination of the President is given as a reducio ad absurdum proof
that not all behavior with some expressive content may be considered expression that
ought to be protected under the First Amendment).
86 There is strong support for the idea that John Wilkes Booth was predominantly
motivated to express an opinion as to the conduct of the Civil War and the treatment of
the southern states by Union troops. Furthermore, Leon Czolgosz's predominant motivation in the assassination of William McKinley was to further the goals of anarchism. See
FINIs L BATES, THE ESCAPE AND SUICIDE OF JOHN WILKEs BOOTH 157.63 (1907) (discussing the motivationi of Booth); 1 CHARLES S. OLCOTr, THE LIFE OF WILLAM McKINLEY 385
(1946) (discussing the motivation for the assassination of McKinley).
87 The Court in OBrien actually reached that conclusion, holding that O'Brien's actions were predominantly conduct and the statute punishing draft card burning was unrelated to the suppression of expression. See infra note 155. Professor Emerson disagrees
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ble that, both in terms of the actor's own understanding of the
card burning and the state's concern with punishing this behavior,
the "conduct" of no longer having a draft card predominates in
the act. As Professor Ely wrote, "burning a draft card to express
opposition to the draft is an undifferentiated whole, 100% action
and 100% expression. It involves no conduct that is not at the
same time communication, and no communication that does not
result from conduct."'
Perhaps we could even say the same of assassination. While
murder usually is motivated by hatred or other feelings about the
victim, a presidential assassination may be motivated by political,
not personal, animus. Public action is the most direct form of
communication. The act demonstrates sincerity and a strength of
conviction in a way that words alone probably could not communicate.
The point here is that a simplistic distinction between speech
and conduct will not add rigor to any attempt to discover how a
bias crime may be distinguished from racist speech. Robert
Viktora's cross burning on the lawn of the Jones family is certainly
an "undifferentiated whole." It is one hundred percent action
directed against the Jones and one hundred percent expression of
a deeply-felt racism. Even simply flying a swastika from one's home
cannot be objectively described as expression alone. It is action as
well. Applying the distinction between conduct and expression
requires a process that assumes its own conclusions. That which
we wish to punish we will term "conduct" with expressive value,
and that we wish to protect we will call "expression" that requires
conduct for its means of communication. The critical decision-which behavior may be punished and which should be protected-is wholly extrinsic to this process. If a meaningful distinction between bias crimes and racist speech exists, it must be found
elsewhere."9

with the Court's decision in the O'Brien case and argues that the expression element
dearly predominates the, activity. Seesupra note 81 and accompanying text.
88 Ely, supra note 52, at 1495.
89 See also Nimmer, supra note 77, at 30-34 (arguing that any attempt to separate
speech from "communicative conduct" will be unsuccessful).
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B. Pure Bias Crimes vs. Penalty Enhancement Laws
The distinction between pure bias crimes and penalty enhancement laws has been asserted to distinguish constitutional
from unconstitutional bias crime laws.
Unlike the speech-conduct distinction, the argument, based
upon the distinction between bias crimes and penalty enhancement laws is of recent origin. This argument figured prominently
in testimony before the House of Representatives Subcommittee
on Crime and Criminal Justice in support of the Hate Crimes
Sentencing Enhancement Act of 1992,' a proposed federal penalty enhancement law. Both'Laurerice Tribe and Floyd Abrams
stated that the proposed legislation was constitfitional because it
sought only to use bias motivation as a factor in sentencing and
not as an element of a crime itself.9
In order to evaluate the usefulness of the distinction between
pure bias crimes and penalty enhancement laws, it is necessary to
return to definitions. Penalty enhancement laws explicitly rely
upon some other criminal provision, such as assault, and increase
the sentence if this, assault was committed with bias motivation.
Penalty enhancement laws may increase the sentence by a given
length of time 9 2 or may increase the "level" of the crime by, for

90 H.R. 4797, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992). The bill was reintroduced on March 1,
1993, as the Hate Crimes Sentencing Enhancement Act of 1993, H.R. 1152, 103d Cong.,
1st Sess.'(1993).
91 Hate Crimes Sentencing Enforcement Act of 1992 Hearings on HR. 4797 Before the
Subcomm. on Cime and CiminalJustice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2d
Sess. 7-30 (1992) [hereinafter Hearings] (statements and testimony of Floyd Abrams and
Laurence Tribe). In criticizing the distinction relied upon by Professor Tribe and Mr.
Abrams, I should note that their testimony represents a different project from that of
this Article. In their testimony, Tribe and Abrams took the Court's decision in R.A.V. as
a given and attempted to argue that H.R. 4797 was -nonetheless constitutional. This was
particularly true of Tribe, who did not endorse RA.V. as much as he accepted it.
Abrams, both in his testimony and elsewhere, explicitly embraced the position of the
majority in RA.V See Hearings, supra, at 22 ("1appear before you as someone who welcomed and publicly praised the Supreme Court's recent ruling in R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul . .. Justice Scalia's ruling for the Court... seemed to me not only correct but
admirable."); Floyd Abrams, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 1992, at A24 (criticizing
editorial which was critical of the RA.V. decision).
I press the more fundamental questions as to the strength of AA.V Although I
share with Abrams and Tribe a pragmatic interest in seeing a federal bias crimes law
enacted, I nonetheless maintain, as argued in the text, that the distinction between pure
bias crimes and penalty enhancement laws is, in the final analysis, untenable. See infra
text accompanying notes 92-99.
92 See, eg., Mo. REV. STAT. § 574.090 (1989) (provides for increased sentences); N.H.
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example, increasing a misdemeanor to a felony or a lower grade
felony to one of greater severity. 9' Moreover, penalty enhancement crimes may mandate an enhancement of the sentence or
may provide discretion to the sentencing judge to increase the
penalty if she deems it appropriate.' All penalty enhancement
laws are thus derivative of some other criminal law. Pure bias
crimes, by contrast, create a free-standing prohibition of some
bias-motivated conduct.
On the surface, this appears to be a distinction with significance. As Professor Tribe stated:
Enhancing a criminal sentence for any "hate crime".., in no
way creates a "thought crime" or penalizes anyone's conduct
based upon a non-proscribable viewpoint or message that such
conduct contains or expresses. In this crucial respect, the trigger for enhanced punishment [laws] differs completely from
the constitutionally problematic trigger for punishment under
the St. Paul ordinance struck down by the Supreme Court in
the RA.V. case."
It is only in appearance, however, that pure bias crimes seem to
be free-standing. If there is any distinction between pure bias
crimes and penalty enhancement laws, it is only that the former
rely upon other criminal statutes implicitly, whereas the reliance of
the latter is explicit. This flows from the very idea of a bias crime.
A concept of two tiers is inherent in any civil rights crime,
including bias crimes.' Every civil rights crime contains within it
a "parallel" crime against person or property. In R.A.V., for example, the parallel crimes of trespass and vandalism exist along side

REV. STAT. ANN. § 651:6(I)(g)

(1991) (provides for increased penalties); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 939.645 (West 1991) (provides for increased sentences).
93 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.085 (West 1990) (increases level of crime); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2927.12 (Baldwin 1992) (increases level of crime); VT. STAT. ANN. ti.
13, § 1455 (1991) (increases level of crime).
94 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. -ANN. § 775.085 (West 1990) (mandatory penalty enhancement); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651:6(I)(g) (1991) (discretionary penalty enhancement).
95 Hearings, supra note 91, at 11-12.
96 The universe of civil rights crimes is composed of three categories: (1) racially
motivated violence or "bias crimes;" (2) unjustifiable use of force under color of law,
such as police brutality or "official crimes;" and (3) interference by non-state officials
with the exercise of certain political or civil rights or "rights interference crimes." See
Lawrence, supra note 3.
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the bias crime charged in the case.17 The bias crime is comprised
of a parallel crime with the addition of bias motivation.
A pure bias crime, therefore, like a penalty enhancement law,
is derivative of some other criminal provision. The distinction is
strictly a matter of form. The nature of the derivative relationship

is made explicit in the penalty enhancement law. For pure bias
crimes, the derivation, although implicit, is no less real.9" If we
conclude, therefore, that pure bias crimes impermissibly punish
ideas and expression, then surely penalty enhancement laws do as
well. In each case, it can be said that the criminal act has already
been punished through the imposition of sentence for the predicate offense (for a penalty enhancement law) or the parallel crime
(for a pure bias crime). Alternatively, if there exists a constitutional basis for imposing an increased sentence under a penalty en-

-

97 In burning a cross on the Jones' lawn, Viktora violated Minnesota criminal law
proscribing acts of trespass onto the Jones property, vandalism, and threats. See MINN.
STAT. § 609.713(1) (Supp. 1993) (terroristic threats); MINN STAT. § 609.563 (1987) (arson); MINN. STAT. § 609.595 (Supp. 1993) (criminal damage to property). The St. Paul
ordinance at issue in RPA.V., however, was not restricted to activities such as Viktora's. By
its terms, the ordinance applied to one who places an object on public property "which
one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in
others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender." ST. PAUL, M1NN. LEGIs.
CODE § 292.02 (1990). By itself, this does not involve an act of trespass, vandalism, or
other parallel act. The ordinance prohibited not only bias crimes, but racist speech as
well. In my view, it is impermissibly overbroad on that basis. See infra text accompanying
notes 146-49.
98 There is another possible difference between pure bias crimes and penalty enhancement laws, but it need not detain us long. In the case of a penalty enhancement
law, bias motivation will always increase the sentence, or at least the potential sentence,
above that provided by law for the predicate crime. It is possible, however, that a pure
bias crime statute will provide a sentence that is less than that provided for the parallel
crime. In New York, for example, bias-motivated harassment is a "Class A" misdemeanor.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.31 (Consol. 1989) (commission of personal or property damage
based on race, religion, or ethnicity is aggravated harassment .inthe first degree). Often
the parallel crime for this personal or property crime will be a felony such as simple or
aggravated assault.
This scenario is consistent with the proposition that pure bias crimes and penalty
enhancement laws are equally derivative. First, the possibility exists for consecutive sentences for the pure bias crime misdemeanor and the parallel felony. The total punishment of the bias crime will therefore exceed that of the parallel crime alone. Second, if
in a given jurisdiction consecutive sentences are not possible (for example, if the pure
bias crime misdemeanor is treated as a lesser included offense of the parallel felony) in
reality, the bias crime count would simply drop out. The bias crime charge requires the
prosecution to meet the difficult burden of proving racial motivation. Because the parallel felony would carry the higher potential sentence and the bias-motivated misdemeanor
would carry the more onerous burden of proof, a prosecutor would not bring bias crime
charges under this law. She would rather prosecute only the parallel crime with its less
exacting burden and its higher potential sentence.

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:673

hancement law, this same basis will justify the imposition of a
sentence under a pure bias crime law. The distinction between the
descriptions of the two types of bias crimes, therefore, cannot provide the constitutional basis for the punishment of bias crimes.
III.

RESOLVING THE HATE CRIMES/HATE SPEECH PARADOX:
BIAS CRIMES AND PARALLEL CRIMES

A.

The Mens Rea of Bias Crimes and Racist Speech

If bias crimes and racist speech cannot be distinguished on a
speech-conduct axis, or through reliance upon the distinction
between pure bias crimes and penalty enhancement laws, can this
distinction be maintained? My proposed distinction begins with the
recognition that, even without the actor's racial motivation, his
commission of a bias crime may be proscribed and constitutes a
crime for which he may be punished. The same cannot be said of
racist speech. Without racial content, there is no suggestion that
speech could or should be prohibited.
In order fully to develop the implications of this observation,
it is necessary to return to the concept of the bias crime as a twotier crime. The distinction between parallel crimes and civil rights
crimes is partially based on the resulting harm of the criminal act.
A racially motivated assault, in addition to causing the general
harm that any assault might cause, frequently also causes an additional, particularly focused psychological harm. The victim suffers
for being singled out on the basis of her race, and the general
community of the target racial group is harmed as well." The
results of bias crimes thus seem worse than those of parallel
crimes. This is certainly the view of the many states that have
enacted penalty °enhancement provisions or pure bias crime laws
for bias crimes.10
The distinction between bias crimes and civil rights crimes is
not result based alone. It also rests on the actor's state of mind. If
the sole distinction were the resulting harm, it would be a distinction without great normative weight because results may be a matter of fortuity. It is largely for this reason that the modern trend
in the study of criminal law has been toward a focus on the state

99 See ANDREW KARMEN, CRIME VICTIMs: AN INTRODUCTON TO VIcrIMOLoGY 262-63
(2d ed. 1990); see also ROBERT EUAS, THE POLITIcS OF VICTIMIZATION (1986); Delgado,
supra note 23, at 143-49; Kretzmer, supra note 7; cf. infra note 165.
100 See supra note 33, 92-94.
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of mind or culpability of the accused. The results of the conduct
are not unimportant, rather, punishment under the criminal law,
whether based on a retributive or consequentialist argument, is
critically linked to the actor's mental state. °1
The results of a bias crime, however, are not a matter of
fortuity but are integrally interwoven with the defendant's state of
mind. The blame of the racially motivated assault perpetrator
differs from that attached to the simple assault perpetrator precisely because of the actor's state of mind, not because of happenstance or coincidence. To establish a bias crime, therefore, the
prosecution must prove two essentially unrelated mens rea elements. The first of these is the mens rea that is applicable to the
parallel crime; for example, the specific intent to commit an assault. Because this is foundational to the bias crime, I call this the
"first-tier" mens rea for a bias crime. In addition, the prosecution
must demonstrate that the accused was motivated by bias in 'the

101 The focus on culpability is consistent with punishment that is grounded either in
retributive goals of meting out just deserts or utilitarian goals of reducing criminal conducL See H.L.A. HART, PuNISHMENT AND REsPONsiBILTrY 26-27 (1968) (specific and general
deterrence, rehabilitation, and incapacitation may be seen collectively as punishment
based upon crime reduction).
Nowhere is the centrality of the accused's mental state to crime utilitarian theory
more clearly visible than in the influential Model Penal Code. See MODEL PENAL CODE §
7.01 (Official Draft 1985) (explicitly rejecting punishment based solely upon retributive
theory). The Code's organizing principle is culpability, and the grading of offenses is
based upon the defendant's culpability as to each element of the crime. See, e.g., id. §
210 (grades of criminal homicide determined by culpability of the accused). Moreover,
the Code prescribes the same punishment for most crimes of attempt, solicitation, and
conspiracy as for the crime attempted or solicited or that is the object of the conspiracy.
Id. § 5.05(1). This is a marked departure from the common law, where inchoate crimes
are punished less severely than the target offense. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSrANDING
CRIMINAL LAW 331, 363 (1987). See generaly HART, supra, at 1-27; HERBERT L. PACKER,
THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 9-145 (1968).
Retribution theory also centers on the culpability of the individual. This is most apparent in retributive theory that justifies punishment strictly based on the incorrect moral
choice made by the individual to do wrong. See IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL

ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 100 (John Ladd trans., 1965). Culpability is of equal import to
those retributivists who are primarily concerned with consequences. Herbert Morris, for
example, has argued that the accused's duty to suffer punishment flows both from his
moral choice and the consequences of.his conduct. See HERBERT MORRIS, ON GUILT AND
INNOcENCE 34-36 (1976); see also GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAw 472-83
(1978) (discussing the relationship between wrongdoing and the consequent harm). The
critical role of individual choice that underpins any deontological theory of punishment
is not negated just because results are relevant to some retributivists. Choice can be understood only in the context of culpability. See Peter Aranella, Convicting the Morally Blameless: Reassessing the Relationship Between Legal and Moral Accountabiliy, 89 UCLA L. REV.
1511, 1534-35 (1992).
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commission of the parallel crime. This is the "second-tier" mens rea
required for a bias crime.

2

As will be demonstrated below, the

second-tier mens rea for bias crimes may be characterized either as
0 3 This second-tier mens rea requires
motive or specific intent."
that the accused have purposely chosen the victim for the parallel
crime because of that victim's race, religion, or ethnicity.
Now we may return to the distinction between bias crimes
and racist speech. The perpetrator of each has the requisite second-tier mens rea of bias motivation. As to first-tier mens rea, however, the two perpetrators are critically different. Consider first the
perpetrator of a bias crime such as the racially motivated assault in
Wisconsin v. MitcheU.0 4 The requisite mens rea for the parallel

crime will generally be recklessness, knowledge, or purpose to
assault another. 0 5 Regardless of the type of bias crime law, if first-

102 See Lawrence, supra note 3.
103 The relevance of the distinction between motive and purpose is discussed infra
Part IV-B. See Helen L Mazur-Hart, Comment, Racial and Religious Intimidation: An Analysis
of Oregon's 1981 Law, 18 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 197, 204-05 (1982) (discussing relationship
between motive and purpose in context of bias crimes).
104 485 N.W.2d 807 (Wis.), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 810 (1992).
105 The parallel crimes of most bias crimes are those committed against persons or
property such as vandalism or assault. To be guilty of these parallel crimes, the accused
must possess either a specific intent with respect to the elements of the crime or at least
act recklessly.
The Model Penal Code has broadened the traditional concept of specific intent to
include not only purposefulness but also knowledge. Under the Code:
A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an offense when:
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the attendant circumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances exists; and
(ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct, he is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(b) (Official Draft 1985).
There will also be instances where the culpability for the parallel crime is less than
specific intent and in which recklessness will suffice for criminal liability. The Model Penal Code defines recklessness as follows:
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when
he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature
and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor's conduct and
the circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from
the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor's
situation.
Id. § 2.02(c).
Consider, for example, an accused who throws rocks at a place of worship. Although specifically motivated by the religious affiliation of the institution, he did not intend to cause any actual property damage. Culpability with respect to bias is certainly
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tier mens rea is absent, there can be no overall culpability for the
bias crime.
Consider the speaker of racist speech. He lacks the first-tier
mens rea for any parallel crime. His mens rea, if indeed this is even
a proper term, as to his parallel behavior, is purely one of expressing himself."°
This distinction, which is keyed to first-tier mens rea, is not a
resurrection of the overly simplistic speech-conduct distinction discussed above which, as we saw, largely assumed its own conclusions.1 1 7 When the distinction is grounded in a mens rea focused
analysis, it rests more firmly. We are not concerned with whether
the accused's behavior is best characterized as "speech" or
"conduct." Indeed, the "perpetrator" of racist speech lacks the
first-tier mens rea for a parallel crime whether his "speech" takes
the form of thinking, talking, flying a flag, or painting a sign. His
behavior-which we, along with Professor Ely, may assume is one
hundred percent action and one hundred percent expression-does not implicate a parallel crime.
For purposes of testing this framework for distinguishing bias
crimes and racist speech, it is helpful to turn back to the facts of
RA.V., Mitchell and Wyant. Not only do the holdings in these
cases represent a judicial trend worthy of critique, but the facts of
these cases cover a broad sweep of possible circumstances of bias
crime commission. The facts of Mitchell best illustrate this dichotomy. Prior to the beating of Riddick, Mitchell and a group of
about ten others were discussing the movie "Mississippi Burning,"
particularly a scene in which a white man beat up a young black
child who was praying. Mitchell asked the group "Do you all feel
hyped up to move on some white people?"' Plainly there is "bias motivation" reflected in Mitchell's comments, but just as plainly
he had not yet committed any parallel crime. Had he stopped at

purposeful, but culpability with respect to the parallel crime of vandalism is only recklessness. In several states he would be guilty of the bias crime of religiously motivated vandalism. See, &g., MD. CRIM. LAW CODE ANN. § 470A (1989); Mo. REV. STAT. § 574.085
(1988); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2927.12 (Anderson 1987).
106 This is not to suggest that the speaker's act of expressing himself is purely
deontological. On the contrary, all expression has ramifications. Indeed, "[e]very idea is
an incitement." Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting). I
do mean to argue, however, that the speaker of racist speech does not seek to cause
injury to a particular victim and thus lacks the mens a associated with a parallel crime
of assault or a similar personal crime..
107 Se supra text accompanying notes 76-89.
108 Mitceel4 485 N.W.2d at 809.
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this point, his actions would have constituted racist speech but not
a bias crime."° Unfortunately, he did not stop there. Mitchell
intentionally directed and encouraged the group to attack Riddick
and thus was a party to the beating. This intentional action constituted the first-tier mens rea for the parallel crime of battery.
Additionally, Mitchell had purposely chosen the victim because he
was white. The intentional selection of Riddick, based on his race,
constitutes the second-tier mens rea. Mitchell's parallel crime of
battery is one that merits punishment. His purposeful choice of a
victim because of his race, under Wisconsin law, is an aggravated
form of that parallel crime.'
Mitchell was not punished for his
earlier racist statement, only his later criminal conduct. We can
therefore conclude that Mitchell committed a bias crime, not unpunishable racist speech."'
The case of Robert Viktora is slightly more complex. Viktora
acted with the first-tier mens rea of purpose when he intentionally
trespassed upon the lawn of his victims and committed acts of
vandalism on their property. He too acted with the requisite second-tier mens rea by purposefully choosing his victim on the basis
of race."1 What makes Viktora's case more complicated than

109 I am assuming that up to this point in the events that culminated in the beating
of Riddick, Mitchell's challenge to the group-were they prepared to "move on some
white people"---was sufficiently removed from the subsequent attack on Riddick so as not,
in and of itself, to represent a "clear and present danger" to Riddick. See Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). In Brandenburg, the Court held that the power of the state to
regulate expression did not reach 'advocacy of the use of force or of law violation" unless the advocacy "is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action" and unless the advocacy "is likely to incite or produce such action." Id. at 447; see, e.g., NAACP
v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 927-29 (1982); Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105
(1973); see also Hans A. Linde, "Cear and Prent Danger" Reexamined: Dissonance in the
Brandenburg Concerto, 22 STAN. L REV. 1163 (1970).
110 In this Article, I seek only to show that states may constitutionally distinguish
between bias crimes and parallel crimes in their criminal codes. While I briefly discuss
the reasons a legislature would choose to enact laws that sanction a bias crime more severely than the parallel crime, see supra notes 90-99, infra notes 163-67, and accompanying
text, an in-depth analysis is beyond the scope of this Article. It is sufficient to assume
here that bias crimes may be punished differently because of the serious harm they cause
to the community and the increased injury to the victim.
111 I am primarily concerned at this point to demonstrate that a workable distinction
exists between that which may be protected and that which may be punished that does
not rely on the speech-conduct dichotomy. This Part does not justify the punishment of
the bias crime itself. This will be addressed infra Part IV.
112 One of Viktora's accomplices in the cross burning was Arthur Morris Miller III
who, prior to the Supreme Court's opinion in RA.V., pleaded guilty to a violation of the
St. Paul ordinance. Miller's plea was vacated following the Supreme Court's decision striking the ordinance down. Subsequently, Miller was indicted under federal housing law, 42
U.S.C. § 3631 (1988), for conspiring to interfere with the Jones family's right of access
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Mitchell's is that Viktora did not merely commit a racially motivated trespass. He burned a cross. Whereas we might be tempted
to analyze Mitchell under the simplistic expression-conduct distinction-Mitchell's assault of Riddick was utterly devoid of expressive
content and is therefore pure "conduct"-there is no such way out
when considering RA.V. Certainly Viktora's conduct carried a
strong communicative content. More than the straight-forward
assault in Mitchegl it triggers unavoidable First Amendment concern.
Because his cross-burning was one hundred percent action
and one hundred percent expression, we must ask precisely what
is the parallel crime Robert Viktora committed in burning a cross
on the Jones' lawn. Put somewhat differently, suppose that Viktora
had burned the cross just outside the Jones' property line and
further suppose that in St. Paul there is no local ordinance banning the burning of non-toxic materials on a public street. Is
there then no parallel crime and thus no bias crime committed by
Viktora?
The question is more clearly focused when we turn to the
case of David Wyant, who was convicted of ethnic intimidation
solely on the basis of using words in an offensive and threatening
manner.'
Has Wyant committed a bias crime and if so, what is
the parallel crime here? If indeed there is not a parallel crime,
then. Wyant's words are protected racist speech. Wyant's actions
pose difficulties for categorization because they seem to involve
only the speaking of words. On the surface, there is only the expression of a racist message and no parallel crime for expression
of some other message. This overlooks, however, the fact that

to housing by intimidation and the threat of force. Miller ultimately pleaded guilty to the
federal charge, acknowledging the crosses were burned with the intention of scaring the
Jones family into moving because they were African-Americans. A 2d Hate-Crime Chargefor
Man After High Court Voided the FTrh N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 23, 1992, at B16.
113 Ohio v. Wyant, 597 N.E.2d 450 (Ohio), cerL granted, 61 U.S.L.W. 3303 (U.S. Sept.
29, 1992) (No. 92-568). Wyant and his family had rented adjoining campsites. They released one of the sites which thereafter was leased by Jerry White and Patricia McGowan,
both of whom are black. Wyant tried unsuccessfully to re-rent the adjoining site and,
when unsuccessful, rented the next site over. During the evening, White and McGowan
complained to park officials about the loud music from Wyant's campsite. Wyant at first
complied with an official's request to turn the music down, but fifteen or twenty minutes
later turned the music on again. In a loud voice, Wyant was heard to say "We didn't
have this problem until those niggers moved in next to us," "I ought to shoot that black
mother fucker," and "I ought to kick his black ass." I. at 450. White and McGowan
complained and then left the park.
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words alone may sometimes constitute a parallel crime. Actions
designed to instill serious fear certainly may be criminalized. It
does not matter whether this behavior takes the form of spoken
words alone or physical conduct alone. Many states have some
form of assault law that proscribes behavior to create fear or terror in a victim.1 14 These laws, variously enacted as "menacing,"
"intimidation," and "threatening" statutes, may be violated through
the defendant's use of words alone.115
Various forms of verbal assault statutes, if sufficiently narrow
in focus, have been upheld by reviewing courts. Intimidation statutes, which criminalize words used to coerce others through fear
of serious harm, are constitutional so long as it is clear that the
words are purposely or knowingly used by the accused to produce
a fear and that the threat is real. 116 Menacing statutes differ
from intimidation statutes. Whereas the focus in intimidation stat-

114 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1(1)(c) (Official Draft 1985) ("A person is
guilty of assault if he . . . attempts by physical menace to put another in fear of imminent serious bodily injury"); iU § 211.3 (a person is guilty of a "terroristic" threat when
one "threatens to commit any crime of violence with the purpose to terrorize another");
id. § 250.4(2) (one is guilty of harassment for taunting another in a manner likely to
provoke a violent response); see alho IOWA CODE ANN. § 708.1(2) (West 1989); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 784.011- (west 1992).
115

See generally KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE 90-

104 (1989) (discussing the punishment of threats); SMOLIA, supra note 56, at 48-50 (government interest in restricting speech is highest where that 'speech threatens physical
harm); Greenawalt, supra note 7, at 298 (speech that is intended primarily to hurt the
listener has limited expressive value and may properly subject the speaker to criminal
punishment).
116 The Montana Intimidation Statute, for example, provides as follows:
(1) A person commits the offense of intimidation when, with the purpose to
cause another to perform or to omit the performance of any act, he communicates to another, under circumstances which reasonably tend to produce a fear
that it will be carried out, a threat to perform without lawful authority any of
the following acts:
(a) inflict physical harm on the person threatened or any other person;
(b) subject any person to physical confinement or restraint; or
(c) commit any felony.
(2) A person commits the offense of intimidation if he knowingly communicates
a threat or false report of a pending fire, explosion, or disaster which would
endanger life or property.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-203 (1991). An earlier version of this statute required only a
threat without any requirement that there be a reasonable tendency that the threat
would produce fear. This earlier version was held to violate the First Amendment in a
federal habeas corpus proceeding. See Wurtz v. Risley, 719 F.2d 1438 (9th Cir. 1983). The
statute was amended to conform with the court's ddcision and has not been challenged
since. See also State v. Lance, 721 P.2d 1258 (Mont. 1986) (upholding § (1)(b) of the
unamended statute).
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utes is upon coercion, the gravamen of menacing is the specific
intent to cause fear. 17 Finally, "terroristic threatening" statutes
are similar to intimidation laws in that they criminalize the use of
fear to achieve specific results." In each case, verbal assault statutes make words alone the basis for a criminal charge when those
words are used purposely or knowingly to create fear in another.
Returning to Wyant's case, our attention is refocused on his
first-tier mens rea. If Wyant intended his abusive language to create
fear in White and McGowan or if Wyant knew that his language
would do so, he committed a parallel crime of verbal assault. Accordingly, if he did so with racial motivation, he committed a bias
crime. If, on the other hand, Wyant lacked the requisite first-tier
mens rea for a verbal assault, then rather than commit a bias
crime, Wyant expressed a racist message. By "expression of a racist
message," I am not invoking the rejected speech-conduct distinction. It does not matter whether the racist speech takes the form
of a racial epithet or burning a cross on one's own property. Analogous behavior is a crime only when the actor's purpose is to put
his victim in a state of fear of imminent serious harm. When he
does so with racial motivation, it is a bias crime. Thus, the epithet
when screamed at the victim in a menacing manner, or the cross
when burned on the lawn of a black family
to terrorize them,
119
becomes not racist speech but a bias crime.

117 The Colorado Menacing Statute, for example, provides that- "A person commits
the crime of menacing if, by any threat or physical action, he knowingly places or attempts to place another person in fear of imminent serious bodily injury." CoLo. REV.
STAT. § 18-3-206 (1992); see, ag., People v. McPherson, 619 P.2d 38 (Colo. 1980) (construing Colorado menacing statute); State v. Garcias, 679 P.2d 1354 (Or. 1984) (upholding Oregon menacing statute, OR. REV. STAT. § 163.190(1) (1992), against First Amendment challenge).
118 The Alaska Terroristic Threatening Statute, for example, provides that a person
commits the crime of terroristic threatening if the person:
(1) knowingly makes a false report that a circumstance dangerous to human life
exists or is about to exist and
(A) places a person in fear of physical injury to any person;
(B) causes evacuation of a building; or
(C) causes serious public inconvenience; or
(2) with intentto place another person in fear of death or serious physical injury to the person or the person's immediate family, makes repeated threats to
cause death or serious physical injury to another person.
ALASKA STAT. § 11.56.810 (1989); see, e.g., Allen v. State, 759 P.2d 541 (Alaska Ct. App.
1988) (upholding constitutionality of Alaska Terroristic Threatening Statute); Thomas v.
Commonwealth, 574 S.W.2d 903 (Ky. 1978) (upholding constitutionality of Kentucky
Terroristic Threatening Statute, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508.080 (Baldwin 1984)).
119 See Lawrence, sui&a note 23, at 435.
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B. A New Understanding of 'Righting Words"
I will now place the understanding of verbal assaults in general, and verbal bias crimes in particular, within the broader context
of First Amendment law. Far from being dissonant with contemporary First Amendment doctrine, the identification of the verbal
assault, as distinct from protected speech, provides a firm basis for
a reworking of the long-established but thinly constructed "fighting
words" doctrine. 2 From its introduction to the present day, the
definition
and scope of "fighting words" have been unclear at
1
best.

12

Before proposing a reformulation of the fighting words doctrine, this Part will review the creation of the doctrine in
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire22 and the doctrinal difficulties apparent since then. Over time, the Court has reinterpreted
"Chaplinsky, both directly and indirectly, such that the fighting
words exception as originally understood lacks coherence as valid
First Amendment doctrine.
In 1942, Walter Chaplinsky was convicted of violating a New
Hampshire ordinance that made it illegal to "call ... [anyone] by
any offensive or derisive name." 2 Chaplinsky, a Jehovah's Wit-

120 The term "fighting words" was introduced into First Amendment discussion in the
Supreme Court's decision in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
121 See, e.g., Stephen W. Gard, Fighting Words as Free Speech, 58 WASH. U. L.Q. 531
(1980) (arguing that the fighting words doctrine cannot withstand First Amendment scrutiny and ought to be abandoned); Thomas F. Shea, 'Don't Bother to Smile When You Call
Me That"-FightingWords and the First Amendment 63 KY. LJ. 1, 15-16 (1975) (arguing that
the Supreme Court has de facto abandoned the fighting words doctrine). But see Philip
Weinberg, R.A.V. and Mitchell: Making Hate Crime a Trivial Pursuit, 25 CONN. L REV. 299
(1993) (arguing that R.A.V. misapplied the fighting words doctrine, which allows regulation of racist speech and bias crimes).
122 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
123 Chaplinsky was convicted under an ordinance that provided:
No person shall address any offensive, derisive or annoying word to any other
person who is lawfully in any street or other public place, nor call him by any
offensive or derisive name, nor make any noise or exclamation in his presence
and hearing with intent to deride, offend. or annoy him, or to prevent him
from pursuing his lawful business or occupation.
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 570:2 (1986).
This law still exists in New Hampshire although with slight modification. Currently,
the New Hampshire disorderly conduct statute provides:
A person is guilty of disorderly conduct if:
I. He knowingly or purposely creates a condition which is hazardous to himself
or another in a public place by any action which serves no legitimate purpose;
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ness, had been distributing religious literature on the streets of
Rochester, New Hampshire, on a busy Saturday afternoon.124 A
resentful crowd gathered around Chaplinsky, and a city marshal
arrived at the scene telling the crowd that Chaplinsky was permit-

H. He:
(a) Engages in fighting or in violent, tumultuous or threatening behavior in a
public place; or
(b) Directs at another person in a public place obscene, derisive, or offensive
words which are likely to provoke a violent reaction on the part of an ordinary
person; or
(c) Obstructs vehicular or pedestrian traffic on any public street or sidewalk or
the entrance to any public building; or
(d) Engages in conduct in a public place which substantially interferes with a
criminal investigation, a fire fighting operation to which RSA 154:17 is applicable, the provision of emergency medical treatment, or the provision of other
emergency services when traffic or pedestrian management is required; or
(e) Knowingly refuses to comply with a lawful order of a peace officer to move
from any public place; or
III. He purposely causes a breach of the peace, public inconvenience, annoyance
or alarm, or recklessly creates a risk thereof, by:
(a) Making loud or unreasonable noises in a public place, or making loud or
unreasonable noises in a private place which can be heard in a public place or
other private places, which noises would disturb a person of average sensibilities;
or

(b) Disrupting the orderly conduct of business in any public or governmental
faciity or
(c) Disrupting any lawful assembly or meeting of persons without lawful authority.
IV. In"this section:
(a) "Lawful order" means:
(1) A command issued to any person for the purpose of preventing said person
from committing any offense set forth in this section, or in any section of Title
LXII or Title XXI, when the officer has reasonable grounds to believe that said
person is about to commit any such offense, or when said person is engaged in
a course of conduct which makes his commission of such an offense imminent;
or

(2) A command issued to any person to stop him from continuing to commit
any offense set forth in this section, or in any section of Title LXII or Title
XXI, when the officer has reasonable grounds to believe that said person is
presently engaged in conduct which constitutes any such offense.
(b) "Public place" means any place to which the public or a substantial group
has access. The term includes, but is *not limited to, public ways, sidewalks,
schools, hospitals, government offices or facilities, and the lobbies or hallways of
apartment buildings, dormitories, hotels or motels.
V. Disorderly conduct is a misdemeanor if the offense continues after a request
by any person to desist; otherwise, it is a violation.
Id. § 644:2.
It is noteworthy that, although C(haplinsky has had an illustrious history as the source
of the "fighting words" doctrine, there are no other reported New Hampshire cases prosecuted under the disorderly conduct statute for the use of "fighting words."
124 Chapinshy, 315 U.S. at 569-70.
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ted to pass out his leaflets but warning Chaplinsky that the crowd
was "getting restless and that he would better go slow." 125 Some
time later, a disturbance did occur and Chaplinsky was escorted by
a police officer toward the police station. On route, Chaplinsky
encountered the city marshal and said "You are a God damned
racketeer" and "a damned Fascist and the whole government of
Rochester are Fascists or agents of Fascists. "126 It was for these
words that Chaplinsky was charged with violating the New Hampshire ordinance.
In a brief opinion for a unanimous Court, Justice Murphy
upheld Chaplinsky's conviction. Citing only Professor Chafee's Free
Speech in the United States 27 for support, Justice Murphy embraced
a categorical approach to First Amendment jurisprudence 12 ' and
asserted that there are "certain well-defined and narrowly limited
classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which has
never been thought to raise, any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the
insulting or 'fighting' words . .

.

29

In the course of the opinion, two largely overlapping definitions for the term "fighting words" were proffered by Justice Murphy. The first was defined in two parts: "fighting words" are "those
which [1] by their very utterance inflict injury or [2] tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace."'"4 The second definition, which came from the construction placed upon the New
Hampshire law by that state's highest court, was restricted to the
second clause: "The statute's purpose was to preserve the public
peace. The direct tendency of [the proscribed] conduct ... is to
provoke the person against whom it is directed to acts of violence." 1 The first definition provides two possible meanings: (1)
words that inflict injury and (2) words that tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. The New Hampshire court's construction only contains the breach of the peace concept, and Justice Murphy incorporated this construction into his conclusion. In

125

State v. Chaplinsky, 18 A.2d 754, 758 (N.H. 1941), afJ'd, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).

126 Chaplinshy, 315 U.S. at 569.
127 ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNrrED STATES (1941).
128 See supra note 52 (discussing proponents and critics of categorical approaches to
the First Amendment).
129 Chaplinshy, 315 U.S. at 571-72 (citations omitted).
130 Id. at 572.
131 State v. Chaplinsky, 18 A.2d 754, 758 (N.H. 1941) (quoting State v. Brown, 38 A.
731, 732 (N.H. 1895)), aftd, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
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sum, the Court upheld the prosecution of Chaplinsky and the
statute under which it was brought because: "It is a statute narrowly drawn and limited to define and punish specific conduct lying
within the domain of state power, the use in a public place of
words likely to cause a breach of the peace."'"2 An understanding of fighting words as those that "by their utterance inflict injury" was rejected.'"
The fighting words exception that emerged from Chaplinsky,
therefore, was, limited to words so insulting as to threaten a
breach of the peace. The only defendant whose conduct has ever
been found by the Supreme Court to constitute the use of "fighting words" was Walter Chapli nsky himself. The Court narrowed

the standard each time it applied it thereafter.
In Cohen v. California,M for example, the Court upheld the
right of Paul Robert Cohen to wear his now-famous 'Fuck the
Draft" jacket in a Los Angeles courthouse. Coh6n had been convicted under a California breach of the peace statute for "offensive
conduct" that was defined as "behavior which has a tendency to
provoke others to acts of violence or in turn disturb the
peace."", The Supreme Court found that Cohen's jacket did not
constitute "fighting words." The Court reasserted the holding in
Chaplinsky that states were "free to ban the simple use, without
demonstration of additional justifying circumstances, of so-called
'fighting words,'" and recognized that the phrase used by Cohen
"is not uncommonly employed in a personally provocative fashion. " "
Nonetheless, the Court refused to uphold the
defendant's conviction for use of fighting words. The Court held
that to constitute fighting words, an individual must direct "personally abusive epithets" at a specific individual. 3 7
Three years after Cohen, in Lewis v. New Orleans,'" it appeared that even "abusive epithets" might not be enough to constitute. "fighting words" absent an actual fist fight. Supporting the

132

Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at'573.

133

See Note, The Demise of the Chaplinsky Fighting Words Doctine: An Argument for its

Interment, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1129, 1137-40 (1993).
134 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
135 Id. at 17 (quoting People v. Cohen, 81 Cal. Rptr. 503, 506 (1969) (emphasis in
original)).
136

Id. at 20.

137 Id.; see Ely, supna note 52, at 1492-93 (After Cohen, "'fighting words' are unprotected, but that category is no longer to be understood as a euphemism for either controversial or dirty talk but requires instead an unambiguous invitation to a brawl.").
138 415 U.S. 130 (1974).
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Court's per curiam opinion that the Louisiana statute at issue in
Lewis was facially overbroad, Justice Powell stated that
words may or may not be "fighting words," depending upon
the circumstances of their utterance. It is unlikely, for example,
that the words said to have been used here would have precipitated a physical confrontation between the middle-aged woman
who spoke them and the police officer in whose presence they
were uttered.5 9
"Fighting words" can only be uttered to those individuals who are
predisposed to fight.) °
The logical weaknesses in the fighting words doctrine were
present at its creation in Chaplinsky. Once the Court abandoned a
reading of "fighting words" based on "[words] which by their very
utterance inflict injury" in favor of those that "tend to incite an
immediate breach of the peace," the "fighting words" doctrine was
doomed to virtual insignificance. Reading "fighting words" as those
likely to inspire violence by the addressee has several problems.
First, taken literally, this would provide precisely the kind of
"heckler's veto" that the Supreme Court properly rejected more
than twenty years ago. 141 Second, this interpretation of "fighting
words" protects those addressees who need it least, namely those
able to fight back. The problem is not merely that the standard of
the reasonably pugilistic addressee is probably male-centered.'42
The problem is that the most severely injured victim of "fighting

139
140
141

Id.at 135.
See Gard, supra note 121, at 550-57; Note, supra note 133, at 1133-34.
See HARRY KALVEN, THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 140-45 (1965) (creat-

ing term "heckler's veto" for ability of hostile crowd to silence the speaker using potential for disturbance as justification). The Court has repeatedly refused to sacrifice freedom of speech to the veto of any angry crowd. While recognizing the need to preserve

public safety, see Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951)

(holding that incitement to

riot was outside the protections of the First Amendment), and Niemotko v. Maryland,
340 U.S. 268 (1951) (Frankfurter, J. concurring) (interrupting speech sometimes necessary

to preserve the peace). The Court has refused to allow suppression of speech solely because the crowd was offended or violent. See Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S 111
(1969) (holding that state could not prohibit parade solely because of the possibility of
violence among the bystanders); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 299 (1963) (holding
that state could not order dispersal of civil rights demonstrators on grounds of the state
house because of the presence of known troublemakers in a hostile but orderly crowd of
spectators); Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961)

(holding that a state could not

prohibit sit-ins solely because other citizens would become angry and possibly violent);
Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) (holding that freedom of speech included the right to express unpopular ideas).
142 See, e.g., GREENAWALT,. supra note 115, at 295-98 (fighting words doctrine is
"androcentric").
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words," the person who is reasonably and sincerely placed in great
fear of imminent serious bodily harm, is the person least likely to
fight back.
The "fighting words" doctrine finds a much firmer footing in
the concept of verbal assault developed above. If Chaplinsky is to
maintain any contemporary vitality, the doctrine must be understood to place outside the reach of the First Amendment those
words that-are intended to and have the effect of creating fear of
injury in the addressee. Words that have the effect, and even the
intent, to hurt the addressee's feelings, however unfortunate, do
not come under this understanding of "fighting words.""-'
I conclude this Part by returning to the context of bias motivation. The proposed understanding of "fighting words" is consistent with a distinction between prosecutable bias crimes and protected racist speech. The theory does not rely on the speech-conduct dichotomy. Racially targeted actions that are intended to
create fear in the addressee and that in fact do so may be constitutionally treated as a bias crime whether the behavior is primarily
by the use of words or by physical act. Racially targeted behavior
that vents the actor's racism is racial speech that is protected by
'the First Amendment, even if it disturbs or insults the observer

greatly. 14

IV. THE ROLE OF CONTENT NEUTRALITY AND THE
INTENT/MOTVATION DISTINcTION

The first three Parts of this Article have demonstrated that a
meaningful distinction exists between bias crimes and racist
speech. Moreover, bias crimes may be punished without removing
First Amendment protection from racist speech. In this final Part,
I turn to two sets of arguments that have been advanced in oppo143 Among the kinds of speech that I conclude should not be considered
proscribable "fighting words" may very well be speech that may be regulated under some
other aspect of First Amendment doctrine. Libelous speech, for example, may give rise to
recovery in tort even though it would not constitute the kind of verbal assault that ought
to be recognized as "fighting words."
144 The understanding of fighting words proposed in this Article is restricted to verbal assaults that are directed at an identifiable victim who is placed in fear of imminent
serious bodily harm. I thus exclude speech that, although deeply offensive to a group,
cannot be said to place the members of that group in such particularized and directed
fear of harm. This approach is consonant with such holdings as Collin v. Smith, 447 F.
Supp. 676 (N.D. Ill.), afd 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), ct denied 439 U.S. 916 (1978),
and dissonant from Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952), a case that is now large-

ly discredited. See supm note 44.
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sition to the constitutionality of bias crime laws. The first, discussed in Part IV-A, returns us to Justice Scalia's argument in
R.A.V. that the St. Paul ordinance was impermissibly based on the
content of speech.'
The second, discussed in Part IV-B, attacks
bias crimes on the theory that these criminal proscriptions
impermissibly punish an actor's motivation.
A.

Bias Crimes and Content Neutrality

Writing for the majority in R.A.V., Justice Scalia accepted the
Minnesota Supreme Court's construction of the St. Paul ordinance as a regulation applying only to "fighting words."' He
held, however, that the ordinance violated principles of content
neutrality because the ordinance applies only to bias-motivated
"fighting words."
Those who wish to use "fighting words" in connection with
other ideas to express hostility, for example, on the basis of
political affiliation, union membership, or homosexuality are
not covered. The First Amendment does not permit St. Paul to
impose special prohibitions on those speakers who express
views on disfavored subjects.'47
Justice Scalia thus held that "fighting words" could "be regulated
because of their constitutionally proscribable content,""~ but
they could not be further regulated based on the content of the
offensive message. 49
At one level, Justice Scalia is correct: content neutrality places
certain restrictions upon the state's ability to proscribe "fighting
words." Surely, a state could not criminalize only those "fighting
words" that are addressed toward members of a particular political

145 See supra text accompanying notes 18, 52-56.
146 RA.V, 112 S. Ct. at 2542 (citing In re Welfare of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507, 510-11
(Minn. 1991)).
147 Id.at 2547.
148 Id. at 2545.
149 As a preliminary matter, the majority's use of "fighting words" in R.A.V is perfectly consistent with the reformulation of that doctrine proposed in Part III-B of this
Article. See supra text accompanying notes 120-43. The majority's opinion reaffirmed
Chaplinshy as valid constitutional doctrine and, by implication, would have upheld an ordinance that prohibited all "fighting words" without regard to their content. "Fighting
words," as understood by the majority, "constitute 'no essential part of any exposition of
ideas.'" RA.V, 112 S. Ct. at 2544 (quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572 (emphasis omitted)). The analysis proposed above focuses on the mens rea of the actor and defines
"fighting words" as those utterances intended to threaten. Threats have never been understood to play any "essential role" in the "exposition of ideas."
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party. To do so would be to establish a plain legislative preference
for one political party over another, or all others. Such approval
and disapproval of a set of political ideas by the state is anathema
to basic First Amendment principles. 150
To accept some role of content neutrality, however, does not
require the all or nothing-at-all approach of Justice Scalia. It is not
necessary to prohibit all "fighting words," or none. Were that the
case, virtually all criminal law would raise issues of content neutrality. A state may properly make a judgment that within the universe
of assaults, some are worse than others. An assault with a deadly
weapon is, in most states, some form of aggravated assault.'
The crime is more serious because the defendant has exposed
society to greater risk-even if the weapon is not actually
used-and has caused greater fear in the victim. These differences
justify an increased penalty for the crime.152 Similarly, a state
may determine that assaults based on race or religion are worse
than comparable assaults that are not 153 because these assaults

cause greater societal harm and injury to the victims.
The initial response to this argument is that the actor who
assaults with a deadly weapon has not sought to "express" anything. The state has made no content-based determination when it
seeks to punish this actor more severely than one who commits a
simple assault. This response, however, is flawed in that it essen1 54
tially relies on the discredited expression-conduct distinction.
Once it is recognized that any public act contains both expressive
and conduct elements, it is impossible to rationalize certain legislative determinations as going only to conduct and others as implicating only expression.

150 See supra note 56.
151 ALA. CODE § 13A-6-20 (1992) (first degree assault defined by use of a dangerous
weapon); ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.200 (1992) (first degree assault defined by causing injury
by means of dangerous instrument); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1204 (1992) (aggravated
assault defined as use of a dangerous weapon); CAL. PENAL CODE § 245 (West 1992) (assault with deadly weapon considered aggravated assault); FLA. STAT. ch. 784.091 (1991)
(aggravated assault defined as use of a dangerous weapon); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-21
(Michie 1992) (aggravated assault defined as use of a dangerous weapon); IDAHO CODE §
18-905 (1992) (aggravated assault defined as use of a dangerous weapon); ILL. REv. STAT.
ch. 38, para. 12-2 (1992) (aggravated assault defined as use of a dangerous weapon).
152 Although I have framed this moral intuition in terms of a harms-based retributive
theory of punishment, it could be formulated to equal effect in a utilitarian deterrencebased model which seeks to punish in order to deter criminal conduct.
153 See infra notes 156-60 and accompanying text.
154 See supra Part II-A.
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The recognition that expression and conduct are analytically
inseparable does not deprive the First Amendment of vigor, however. It does strongly suggest that the traditional content-neutrality
inquiry poses the wrong question. The proper inquiry is that articulated by the Court in United States v. O'Briem"5 "[A] governmental regulation is sufficiently justified ... if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest [that] is unrelated to
the suppression of free expression."5 6
The O'Brien test requires more than a mere articulation of
some legitimate interest by the state. A state could always claim an
interest. As Professor Ely observed, "Restrictions on free expression
are rarely defended on the ground that the state simply didn't
like what the defendant was saying. " 1 7 The state must therefore
be able to advance a nonpretextural justification for the distinctions drawn in its criminal law, a justification that stands independent of any effort to suppress the expression of ideas.
Consider the example of the federal criminal law that explicitly defines the assassination or threatened assassination of the President of the United States as a crime that is unlike any other murder."s In RA.V., Justice Scalia explicitly stated that this statute
satisfied the requirements of content-neutrality because the distinction at issue "consists entirely of the very reason the entire
class of speech at issue is proscribable." 5 9 This reasoning warrants closer analysis. According to Justice Scalia, threats of physical
violence are exempt from First Amendment protection in the first
place in order to protect the public "from the fear of violence,
from the disruption that fear engenders, and from the possibility
that the threatened violence will occur. " ' 60 These three reasons,
he held, "have special force when applied to the person of the

155 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
156 Id. at 377. In O'Bren, the Court concluded that regulations prohibiting the destruction of draft cards furthered the important governmental interest of maintaining
selective service records, an interest found to be unrelated to the suppression of expression. I&. at 382.
157 See Ely, supra note 52, at 1496.
158 See 18 U.S.C. § 871 (1988) (criminalizing threats of violence against the President
of the United States). Section 871 has been challenged and upheld by the Supreme
Court. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (upholding facial validity of statute;
specific threat in Watts held to be insufficient to satisfy requirements of section 871); see
also supra text accompanying notes 80-83.
159 R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2545; see supra text accompanying note 61.
160 RA.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2546; see Larry Alexander, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Summer/Fall
1992, at 49, 50-51 (bias crimes are more harmful than parallel crimes but not necessarily
along the "dimension of harm that makes assaults proscribable").
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President."16 1 The government could not, however, "criminalize
only those threats against
the President that mention his policy of
162
aid to inner cities."

Justice Scalia's analysis constructs three levels of specificity at
which threats might be criminalized:
(1) all threats of physical violence against another person;
(2) all threats of physical violence against the President of the
United States; and
(3) all threats of physical violence against the President of the
United States because of a particular policy.
Whereas both (1) and (2) are permissible, (3) is not. Although I
share these conclusions, Justice Scalia's own reasoning in R!A.V.
provides insufficient support for them. Format (2) is considered
"content-neutral" because it springs from the very reasons that
threats are outside the First Amendment. But a threat against the
President could be better described as being comprised of two
components. The first is a simple threat against a person. The
punishment of this component of the threat against the President
is fully covered by format (1). The second component of the
threat against the President is a particularly virulent opposition to
the President. This opposition might stem from a single policy of
the President or from an array of causes. Seen in this light, (2) is
no more content-neutral than (3). Formats (2) and (3) differ only
in their level of specificity, not in their "neutrality" as to content.
The acceptability of (1) and (2) and the impermissibility of
(3) may be better understood through application of the O'Bien
test as developed above. The state can articulate numerous reasons
for format (1) other than the suppression of expression. These in
fact are the reasons set out by Justice Scalia: the need to protect
the populace from the fear of violence, from the negative consequences of this fear, and from the possibility that the threatened
violence may occur. Similarly, these are legitimate reasons for
format (2). The federal government reasonably fears that violence
directed against the President will cause serious harm to the nation. This avenue of expressing opposition to the President, therefore, is foreclosed. Finally, format (3) may not be justified by
legitimate reasons. By criminalizing threats against the President
only insofar as they are based on opposition to a particular policy,

161
162

Id.
Id.
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the government would be expressing a preference for certain policies as against others and acting only to suppress opposition to
those policies. Under the O'Brien standard, this is not allowed.
I now return to the context of bias crimes. Here too, the
critical question is not whether bias crime laws are in some technical sense content-neutral. Clearly they are not. Bias crime laws
select a sub-set from the universe of parallel crimes. They do so
on the basis of the actor's selection of a victim because of race,
religion, or ethnicity. But we saw that the government may select a
sub-set from all threats of violence and do so on the basis of the
actor's motivation when that motivation leads to the discriminatory
selection of the President as the victim.
We must subject bias crime statutes to the same test that
explained the permissibility of the laws punishing threats directed
against the President. We must ask whether bias crime statutes
further an important interest unrelated to the suppression of racist
speech. I believe the evidence is compelling that they do. Among
the state interests served by laws particularly targeting bias crimes
are: the need to deter generally a rapidly increasing form of
crime"6 and specifically to deter a perpetrator with a high degree of potential dangerousness; 16 and the desire to address a
crime that has a particularly injurious effect both on the
victim" and the targeted group." Indeed, these are among

163 There is ample evidence upon which a state could rely to support a finding that
bias crimes are increasing in frequency. See supra note 4. For federal legislation requiring
reporting of hate crimes, see Hate Crime Statistics Act, 104 Stat. 140 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 534 (1988)). See also ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, supra note 31, at 44-45;
Hate Crime Legislation Under Attack, KLANWATCH INTELLIGENCE REP. (Southern Poverty Law
Project, Montgomery, Ala.), Feb. 1993, at 9, supra note 31. A legislative conclusion that a
type of crime is occurring more frequently may justify an increased penalty over otherwise similar crimes. See, eg., Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 379 (1910).
164 A perpetrator of a crime who is motivated to select his victims on the basis of
their race, religion, or ethnicity is a likely candidate to continue to commit such crimes,
spurred on by the bias that-apart from the context of any particular attack-leads to a
desire to search out and attack his victims. JACK McDEvrrr, THE STUDY OF THE CHARACTER OF CIVIL RIGHTS CRIMES IN MASSACHUSETTS (1993). Such concerns have routinely
been held to support enhanced sentencing. See, e.g., Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880,
896 (1983); see also Gholson v. Texas, 542 S.W.2d 395 (Tex. 1976) (advocacy of violence
against the white race and black supremacy admissible in sentencing phase of a capital
trial for purpose of showing a propensity to commit future acts of violence on the part
of the defendants).
165 Studies of bias crimes have demonstrated that they tend to be more violent and
more vicious than other violent crimes. Typically, the perpetrators of bias crimes outnumber the victims by a ratio of roughly four to one. McDEvIrr, supra note 164. The dynamics of these assaults often lead to particularly horrifying results because a mob-mentality
combines with the primal feelings which are believed to be the dominant forces at play
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the arguments presented to the Supreme Court by the state
of
16 7
Wisconsin in support of its bias crime law in the Mitchell case.
Bias crime statutes thus stand on grounds wholly independent
of efforts to suppress racist speech. The standard articulated in
O'Brien, which ought to inform the inquiry as to the constitutionality of these criminal prohibitions, is thereby satisfied.
B.

The Punishment of Radally Motivated Violence

The primary basis for overturning bias crime laws in R.A.V., as
well as in both Mitchell and Wyant, was drawn purely from First
Amendment doctrine. There is an additional argument, drawn
from a blend of First Amendment concerns and substantive criminal law, that was advanced by the Wisconsin and Ohio Supreme
Courts. The courts in Mitchell and Wyant held that the Wisconsin
and Ohio bias crime laws, respectively, impermissibly strayed beyond the punishment of act and purposeful intent and went on to
punish motivation. 1" These holdings, however, are not required
by a careful analysis of the relevant doctrines. This may be demonstrated by both descriptive and normative argument.
As a purely descriptive matter, the concern with the punishment of motivation is misplaced. Motive is often the basis for
punishment. Prominent among the recognized aggravating factors
that may contribute to the imposition of the death penalty in
states with capital punishment are those dealing with the
defendant's motivation for the homicide. Murder motivated by

when prejudice leads to acts of violence. Id. Moreover, the adverse psychological effects
of bias crimes on victims exceed by far those suffered by the victims of parallel crimes.
See, eg., Weiss et al., Ethnoviolence at Wo,J. INTERGROUP RE.ATIONS, Winter 1991-92, at
27-30.
166 Bias crimes will frequently cause an additional, and particularly focused, psychological harm upon the victim for being singled out on the basis of her race as well as a
broader harm upon the general community of the targeted racial group. See KARMEN,
supra note 99, at 262-63; see also EuAS, supra note 99, at 116-24; Delgado, supra note 7,
at 383-86; Kretzmer, supra note 7, at 462-63.
167 Brief for Petitioner at 13-23, Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 810 (1992) (No. 92515) (graning cert.). The author served as a consultant to the petitioner. The views expressed in this Article do not necessarily represent those of the Department of Justice of
the state of Wisconsin.
168 "Because all of the [parallel] crimes . . . are already punishable, all that remains
is an additional punishment for the defendant's motive in selecting the victim. The punishment of the defendant's bigoted motive by the hate crimes statute directly implicates
and encroaches upon First Amendment rights." Mitchel4 485 N.W.2d at 812; see Wyant,
597 N.E.2d at 456-58.
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profit is a significant
aggravating factor adopted in most capital
169
sentencing schemes.

Bias motivation itself may serve as an aggravating circumstance. The Supreme Court explicitly upheld the use of racial bias
as an aggravating factor in the sentencing phase of a capital case
in Barclay v. Florida,'"0 and recently reaffirmed the Barclay holding.' 7 1 Moreover, several federal civil rights
crimes statutes explic17 2
itly make racial motivation an element.
Finally, racial motivation is the sine qua non for a vast set of
civil anti-discrimination laws governing, for example, discrimination
in employment 7 3 and housing. 17 4 In the recent case of Bray
Alexandria Women's Health Clinic'," the Court interpreted the
scope of section 1985(3),176 the civil counterpart of section 241.
The Court held that a plaintiff had to prove that the defendant's
actions had been motivated by "some racial[ly] . . . discriminatory

169 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(3)(g) (Official Draft 1985) (among aggravating circumstances to be considered is whether the "murder was committed for pecuniary
gain"); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. ch. 952, § 53a-46a (1958); DEL. CODE ANN. ch. 42, §
4209 (1974 & Supp. 1992); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 630, § 5 (1986 & Supp. 1992); see
aso Eric J. Grannis, Note, Fighting Word$ and FightingFreestyle. The Constitutionality of Penally
Enhancement for Bias Crimes, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 178, 192 (1993); Note, Hate is Not Speech:
A Defense of Penally Enhancement for Hate Cimes, 106 HARv. L. REv. 1314, 1323-31 (1993).
170 463 U.S. 939, 949 (1983) ('rhe United States Constitution does not prohibit a
trial judge from taking into account the elements of racial hatred" provided it is relevant
to the aggravating factors.).
171 See Dawson v. Delaware, 112 S. Ct. 1093 (1992). In Dawson, the issue was the
defendant's membership in the Aryan Brotherhood. The Court held that because the
defendant had been convicted of a same race murder and the prosecution did not argue
that the defendant's relationship with the Aryan Brotherhood was indicative of a future
propensity for violence, the evidence was irrelevant and therefore inadmissible. In reaching that holding, the Court reaffirmed their holding in Barclay that evidence of racial
intolerance and subversive advocacy were admissible where such evidence was relevant to
the issues involved. The Court held that introduction of the evidence did not necessarily
infringe on the defendant's First Amendment freedom to associate. Id. at 1097.
172 See 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2) (1988) (proscribing force or intimidation against a victim because of the victim's race and because the victim is engaged in one of certain
enumerated activities); 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1988) (proscribing, inter alla, disparate punishment of persons based on race or national origin); 42 U.S.C. § 3631 (1988) (proscribing
racially motivated interference with right of access to housing by intimidation and the
threat of force).
173 Se, eg., Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988 & Supp. III
1992); see also Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989); Texas Dep't of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) (a disparate treatment claim requires
a showing of intentional discrimination by the defendant); Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v.
Feeney, 422 U.S. 256 (1979).
174 See Fair Housing Act of 1968, § 804, 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1988).
175 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993).
176 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1988).
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animus."177 If the Wyant and Mitchell courts were correct in as-

serting that bias crimes unconstitutionally punish motivation, then
this argument should apply with equal weight to those statutory
schemes that authorize civil damage awards to otherwise permissi-

ble actions, for example, discharging an at-will employee because
of the employer's racial motivation. 17 In sum, bias motivation
plays a role in criminal punishment and civil liability under numerous federal and state laws. As a descriptive matter, therefore,
the Wyant and Mitchell courts' concern with punishing motivation
is unwarranted.
The second flaw with the argument that motive may not be a
basis for punishment is more abstract. The argument against the
punishment of motive is necessarily premised on the assertion that
motive can be distinguished from mens rea or intent. Plainly an
actor's intent is a permissible basis for punishment and does in
fact serve as the organizing mechanism of modern theories of
criminal punishment.'7 9 On some level, motive and intent may
be distinguished. Intent concerns the mental state provided in the
definition of an offense in order to assess the actor's culpability
with respect to the elements of the offense. 180 Motive, on the
other hand, concerns the cause that drives the actor to further
that purpose.' This is the distinction relied upon by Professor
Gellman in support of her argument that bias crimes
impermissibly punish motive, an argument in turn relied upon by
182
the courts in both Mitchell and Wyant.

177 )ray, 113 S. Ct. at 758 (quoting Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102
(1971)).
178 Se, ag., Weinstein, First Amendment Challenges to Hate Crimes Legislation. Where's the
Speech?, CRIM.JUST. ETiHICS, Summer/Fall 1992, at 14-15 (First Amendment governs regulations of speech whether civil or criminal); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 277 (1964) (same).
Because there is no parallel crime where, for example, employment discrimination
occurs, I would argue that, as a matter of criminal law doctrine, there ought to be no
bias rime. But as a matter of constitutional law, the requirements of the First Amendment ought to be the same.
179 See Kenneth W. Simons, Rethinking Mental States, 72 B.U. L REV. 463, 468-71
(1992); supra note 101.
180 See, eg., Simons, supra note 179, at 467; DRESsLER, supra note 101, at 96-97; see
also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a)(i) (Official Draft 1985) (defining the mental state
of "purpose" as a person's conscious object to engage in certain conduct or cause a
certain result).
181 See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUsTIN W. ScoTr, CRIMiNAL LAW § 3.6, at 227-28 (2d ed.
1986); see also James Morsch, Comment, The Problem of Motive in Hate Crimes: The Argument
Against Presumptions of Racial Motivation, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRMINOLOGy 659, 666 (1991).
182 See Gellman, supra note 22, at 362-79; Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d at 820; Wyant 597
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Although intent and motive are not identical, the distinction
will not hold the weight that the Mitchell and Wyant courts place
upon it. Motive and intent have some descriptive value, but the
decision as to what constitutes each varies depending on what is
being criminalized. What is a matter of intent in one context, may
be a matter of motive in another.s Consider the bias crime of
a racially motivated assault upon an African-American. There are
two equally accurate descriptions of this crime: one views the bias
as a matter of intent; the other as a separate matter of motive.
The perpetrator of this crime could be seen as either:
(1) possessing a mens rea of purpose (or knowing or recklessness) with respect to the elements of assault along with a motivation of racial bias; or
(2) possessing a first-tier mens rea of purpose (or knowing or
recklessness) with respect to the elements of the parallel crime
of assault and a second-tier mens rea of purpose with respect to
the element of discriminatory victim selection.
The defendant in description (1) "intended" to assault his victim
and did so because he is a racist. The defendant in description (2)
"intended" to assault an African-American and therefore acted with
both an intent to assault and a discriminatory intent as to the
selection of the victim.
Because both descriptions are accurate, Professor Gellman's
argument fails. Whether bias crimes punish motivation or intent is
not inherent in those prohibitions. Rather, it is a function of the
way in which we choose to describe them. What Wisconsin and
Ohio, and indeed more than a score of other states, seek to punish in their bias crime laws is the discriminatory selection of a victim.1 Nothing in criminal law doctrine bars them from doing
SO. 84

N.E.2d at 456-58.
183 See Grannis, supra note 169, at 189-91; Douglas N. Husak, Motive and Criminal
Liability, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Winter/Spring 1989, at 3, 4-8; Jeffrie G. Murphy, Bias Cimes:
What Do Hates De-serve?, CRIM. JuST. ETHICS, Summer/Fall 1992, at 20, 21-23. It is noteworthy that when Professor Sayre sought a definition for mens 7ea he drew upon the
concept of motivation. "Mes tra", Sayre wrote, involves "a general immorality of motive."
Franklin B. Sayre, The Present Signification of Mens Rea in the Criminal Law, in HARVARD
LEGAL ESSAYS 399, 411-12 (1934).
184 There is yet a third argument that may be advanced in addition to the descriptive argument that motive is often a basis for criminal punishment and the normative
argument that the motive-intent distinction is not fixed but contextual. It may be asserted
that, in the final analysis, bias crimes do not punish motive. This may be illustrated
through reference to Mitchell It is clear that Todd Mitchell selected a white victim and
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V.

CONCLUSION

The clash between the values - underpinning the hate
crimes/hate speech paradox has produced an unusual level of
explicit ambivalence. Perhaps this is not surprising. Those judges
and scholars who argue that bias crime laws and regulations of
racist speech unlawfully interfere with the rights of free expression
have felt obliged to stress their resulting heart-ache."s
The conflict that gives rise to this deep ambivalence, however,
is based on a misunderstanding of bias crimes. Bias crime laws,
properly understood, do not attack racist beliefs. Rather they penalize intentionally or knowingly causing harm to a victim on the
basis of his or her ethnicity, race, religion, or sexual orientation.
Bias crime statutes are not only constitutional, they represent the
highest expression of a societal commitment to racial, religious,
and ethnic harmony.

that he participated in a battery. Why he did so is unclear. He may have done so because he is a racist, but he may have done so merely to impress his friends. For the
purposes of the relevant Wisconsin bias crime statute, it is irrelevant. Significantly, no
evidence was introduced at the trial in Mitchell as to why he selected Riddick for the
battery.
185 See,eg., RA.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2550 ("Let there be no mistake about our belief
that burning a cross in someone's front yard is reprehensible."); Wyan4 597 N.E.2d at
452 ("Before undertaking an analysis of the statute, however, we express our abhorrence
for racial and ethnic hatred, and especially for crimes motivated by such hatred."); Mitch-

e1 485 N.W.2d at 814 ('he statute commendably is designed to punish--and thereby
deter-racism and other objectionable biases, but deplorably unconstitutionally infringes
upon free speech."); Gellman, supra note 22, at 334; Post, supra note 25, at 271.

